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Customized Procedure in Theory and
Reality
W. Mark C. Weidemaier ∗
Abstract
Contract theory has long posited that parties can maximize
contract value by manipulating the procedural rules that will
apply if there is a dispute. Beyond choosing a litigation or
arbitration forum, parties can allocate costs and fees, alter
pleading standards, adjust evidentiary and discovery rules, and
customize nearly every aspect of the adjudication process. In time,
this theoretical insight became a matter of faith. The assumption
that contracts routinely alter procedural rules spawned debate
over the normative implications of allowing parties to dictate
procedure. Only recently have a few studies suggested that this
debate may lack a firm empirical foundation.
This Article presents a comprehensive picture of dispute
resolution practices in commercial contracts, one that corrects for
many of the limitations of the existing research and focuses on
both binding and non-binding mechanisms. Parties do exercise
autonomy in structuring the rules of adjudication, but they do so
within a limited domain. Contracts almost always specify the
governing law and routinely designate a litigation or arbitration
forum, and a substantial minority allocate responsibility for
attorney fees. In arbitration, parties go further, frequently
allocating costs, imposing expertise requirements, and shaping
decision-making dynamics (as by requiring multiple arbitrators).
In neither forum, however, do parties expressly modify governing
rules of pre-trial, trial, or arbitration procedure. The findings
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imply that it is premature to debate the normative implications of
allowing parties to dictate judicial procedures, for contracts rarely
employ the kinds of clauses that have provoked concern. Yet, the
findings also call for a more complete account of procedural
contracting—one that explains why parties do not more fully
exercise their procedural autonomy.
Table of Contents
I. Introduction ...................................................................1867
II. The Advantages and Types of Customized
Procedure .......................................................................1875
A. Customized Procedure Can Improve Accuracy,
Reduce Drafting and Enforcement Costs, and
Reveal Information ..................................................1876
B. The Many (Potential) Forms of
Customized Procedure .............................................1881
III. Why Don’t Parties Exercise Their Procedural
Freedom? ........................................................................1887
A. The Limited Evidence of Procedural
Customization ..........................................................1888
B. Efforts to Explain the Rarity of Customized
Procedure .................................................................1892
1. Negative Signaling.............................................1893
2. Contracts and the Product Innovation
Cycle ...................................................................1895
3. Procedural Contracting Is Too Costly ...............1897
C. The Limits of These Explanations ..........................1900
IV. A Closer Look at Commercial Contracts .......................1905
A. The Dataset .............................................................1905
B. A First Look: Dispute Resolution as a Point
in Negotiations.........................................................1909
1. Resolving Disputes Before the Filing of
Formal Adversary Proceedings .........................1910
2. Changing the Rules of Binding
Adjudication .......................................................1911
C. A More Detailed View: Off-the-Rack and
Custom Rules ...........................................................1914

CUSTOMIZED PROCEDURE

1867

1. Choice of Law and Forum: The Preference
for New York ......................................................1914
2. Arbitration and the Dominance of the
AAA and ICC .....................................................1919
3. Customizing Off-the-Rack Rules .......................1921
4. A Closer Look at Arbitration .............................1925
V. Implications ...................................................................1930
A. On Negative Signals and Product Cycles................1932
B. Coarse, Not Granular, Procedural Tailoring ..........1936
VI. Conclusion ......................................................................1942
I. Introduction
When commercial actors negotiate contracts, they
understand that there is some chance of a dispute. Knowing this,
their negotiations may encompass not only their primary
obligations but also the rules that will govern an adjudication if
one should occur. Consider an agreement in which Seller
promises to supply a technologically advanced product meeting
specifications that Buyer cannot or will not provide in advance. 1
Because the product is technically complex and Buyer’s needs will
not become clear until later, the contract cannot precisely state
Seller’s obligations. 2 But the imprecision increases the risk that,
in a dispute over product quality, a court will be unable to detect
1. See, e.g., Manufacturing Agreement between Ionics EMS, Inc. and
Microtune, Ltd. Partnership (May 24, 2005) (contracting to purchase electronic
modules and circuit boards manufactured according to specifications made at a
later date) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The example is
similar to one in Daphna Kapeliuk & Alon Klement, Contractualizing Procedure
21 (Dec. 31, 2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review) [hereinafter Contractualizing Procedure].
2. See Contractualizing Procedure, supra note 1, at 21 (explaining how
technological complexity can introduce uncertainty into negotiations); see
generally Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in
Contract Design, 115 YALE L.J. 814 (2006) (analyzing the choice of vague or
precise contract terms as a trade-off between investing at the front- or back-end
of the contracting process). This is a subset of the larger problem that “[t]he
diversity of risks tends to prevent contractual parties from designing a complete
contract ex ante.” Eric Brousseau, Régis Coeurderoy & Camille Chaserant, The
Governance of Contracts: Empirical Evidence on Technology Licensing
Agreements, 163 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 205, 209 (2007).
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a breach by Seller. 3 The prospect of adjudicator error may
diminish Seller’s incentives to perform, and Buyer, knowing this
to be true, may discount the price it will pay. 4 Under these
circumstances, both Seller and Buyer should be willing to commit
to a more accurate method of adjudication, if one can be found at
reasonable cost. 5
To accomplish this, the parties may modify the background
rules of litigation. For example, if they want to avoid the
unpredictable, ex post application of choice of law rules, they can
specify the governing law in the contract. 6 They can agree to
arbitrate future disputes if they expect arbitrators to more
accurately detect breach. 7 If they prefer to go to court, they can
3. Contract theory often assumes that parties do not contract over nonverifiable factors, although this assumption is inconsistent with actual
contracting practices. On the more complex role of verifiability in enforcing and
drafting contracts, see generally Albert Choi & George Triantis, Completing
Contracts in the Shadow of Costly Verification, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 503 (2008)
(exploring conditions under which parties may adopt costly-to-verify measures);
Gillian K. Hadfield, Judicial Competence and the Interpretation of Incomplete
Contracts, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 159 (1994) (critiquing the binary model of
competence in which courts either can or cannot verify compliance).
4. The buyer has other, also unpalatable, alternatives, such as investing
in costly efforts to monitor Seller’s performance.
5. See Contractualizing Procedure, supra note 1, at 21 (describing how
increased accuracy can improve performance incentives). If a procedural
arrangement disproportionately benefits one party, this may require a transfer
payment or concession elsewhere in the agreement. Id. at 18.
6. See, e.g., ERIN A. O’HARA & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE LAW MARKET 68
(2009) (discussing the value of contracting for preferred state law); see also Erin
A. O’Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, From Politics to Efficiency in Choice of Law, 67
U. CHI. L. REV. 1151, 1153–53 (2000) (critiquing prevalent approaches and
arguing that choice of law rules should facilitate party choice).
7. A more formal statement of the choice between arbitration and
litigation is that parties will select the forum that offers greater governance
benefits, net of dispute resolution and drafting costs. See Keith N. Hylton,
Agreements to Waive or Arbitrate Legal Claims: An Economic Analysis, 8 SUP.
CT. ECON. REV. 209, 223–26 (2000) (discussing the link between adjudication
forum and governance benefits); Christopher R. Drahozal & Keith N. Hylton,
The Economics of Litigation and Arbitration: An Application to Franchise
Contracts, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 549, 550 (2003) (analyzing choice between
arbitration and litigation in franchise agreements). Other considerations also
influence the choice. For example, cost-effective enforcement may allow parties
to economize on drafting costs by replacing precise terms with vague (and
cheaper-to-draft) ones. See Scott & Triantis, supra note 2, at 818 (exploring the
choice between precise and vague terms). A desire for confidentiality and other
considerations also may lead parties to prefer arbitration, just as competing
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specify the forum and waive (or retain) the right to a jury trial. 8
Within their chosen forum, they can change the rules allocating
costs and attorney fees and can even try to dictate procedure in
minute detail. Pleading standards, evidentiary and discovery
rules, burdens of proof—all of these are potentially subject to
party control. 9 Because the possibilities are vast and exist in both
litigation and arbitration, I will refer to such modifications
generally as “customized adjudication” or “customized procedure.”
Many observers, from different theoretical perspectives,
embrace the possibilities of customized procedure, especially in
contracts between sophisticated commercial actors. 10 But even in
considerations (such as the desire for robust appellate review) may lead them to
favor litigation. See Thomas J. Stipanowich & J. Ryan Lamare, Living With
ADR: Evolving Perceptions and Use of Mediation, Arbitration and Conflict
Management in Fortune 1,000 Corporations, 19 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 16
(2013) (describing survey results in which corporate counsel reported reasons for
selecting arbitration).
8. See, e.g., Contractualizing Procedure, supra note 1, at 7 (noting
prevalence of choice of forum clauses, jury trial waivers, and other terms);
Robert G. Bone, Party Rulemaking: Making Procedural Rules Through Party
Choice, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1329, 1342–52 (2012) (reviewing the law on party
rulemaking and noting the limited case law discussing many possible forms of
procedural tailoring); Jaime Dodge, The Limits of Procedural Private Ordering,
97 VA. L. REV. 723, 747 (2011) (“Parties are also contracting to modify the
decision-making procedures during motion practice and trial.”); Henry S. Noyes,
If You (Re)Build It, They Will Come: Contracts to Remake Rules of Litigation in
Arbitration’s Image, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 579, 599–607 (2007) (discussing
various customizations to the litigation process, including jury trial waivers).
9. See, e.g., Contractualizing Procedure, supra note 1, at 6–10 (listing
potential modification to procedural rules); Scott & Triantis, supra note 2, at
856–78 (identifying benefits of party control over burdens of proof and giving
examples from commercial practice); Dodge, supra note 8, at 746–50 (identifying
potential procedural modifications); Robert J. Rhee, Towards Procedural
Optionality: Private Ordering of Public Adjudication, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 514,
536–540 (2009) (favoring party control over many aspects of public adjudication
and proposing a unilateral option to shift attorney fees in exchange for
assuming a higher burden of proof); John W. Strong, Consensual Modifications
of the Rules of Evidence: The Limits of Party Autonomy in the Adversary System,
80 NEB. L. REV. 159, 164 (2001) (“[P]arties are allowed wide discretion in
determining what rules of evidence are to be enforced in a judicial
proceeding . . . .”).
10. See generally Scott & Triantis, supra note 2; Contractualizing
Procedure, supra note 1; Daphna Kapeliuk & Alon Klement, Changing the
Litigation Game: An Ex Ante Perspective on Contractualized Procedures, 91 TEX.
L. REV. 1475 (2013) [hereinafter Changing the Litigation Game]; Choi &
Triantis, supra note 3; Rhee, supra note 9; Michael L. Moffitt, Customized
Litigation: The Case for Making Civil Procedure Negotiable, 75 GEO. WASH. L.
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that context, not everyone is ready to concede “[c]ontract law’s
sovereignty over litigation procedure.” 11 Enthusiasm for party
control is tempered by an equally rich vein of scholarship
exploring the limits and normative implications of customized
adjudication, especially when parties dictate procedure in public
courts. 12
Yet for all its theoretical richness, this debate may rest on a
shaky empirical foundation. Transactional lawyers and their
clients, it seems, do not share the enthusiasm for customized
procedure. 13 Relevant studies are scarce but find little evidence
that commercial contracts routinely include custom procedural
clauses. 14 These studies have shifted attention to the reasons why
parties do not exercise their supposed procedural autonomy.
Have enthusiasts overstated the benefits, or under estimated the
costs, of customized procedure? 15 Or is there some other reason
contracts have been slow to adopt custom procedural clauses? 16
This Article makes two primary contributions to this
developing field. First, it presents the most comprehensive
REV. 461 (2007); Noyes, supra note 8.
11. David A. Hoffman, Whither Bespoke Procedure?, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV.
389, 391 (2014).
12. Prominent examples include Bone, supra note 8; Scott Dodson, Party
Subordinance in Federal Litigation, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (2014); Linda S.
Mullenix, Another Choice of Forum, Another Choice of Law: Consensual
Adjudicatory Procedure in Federal Court, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 291 (1988); Kevin
E. Davis & Helen Hershkoff, Contracting for Procedure, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV.
507 (2011); Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593
(2005); Dodge, supra note 8; David Marcus, The Perils of Contract Procedure: A
Revised History of Forum Selection Clauses in the Federal Courts, 82 TULANE L.
REV. 973 (2008).
13. See infra Part II.A (surveying existing studies, which find limited
evidence of procedural customization).
14. See infra Part II.A (noting the lack of customized procedure in
commercial agreements).
15. For example, Christopher Drahozal and Erin O’Hara O’Connor argue
that the costs of producing custom clauses often exceed the benefits. See
Christopher R. Drahozal & Erin O’Hara O’Connor, Unbundling Procedure:
Carve-Outs from Arbitration Clauses, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1945, 1955–61, 1990–91
(2014) (describing procedural contracting primarily as a choice between
litigation and arbitration, supplemented by an election to reserve certain claims
or remedies for an alternate forum) [hereinafter Unbundling Procedure].
16. See infra Parts II.B–C (describing and critiquing three prevailing
explanations).
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picture to date of how commercial contracts use customized
procedure in both litigation and arbitration. 17 The sample, which
consists of over 400 contracts entered over the past fifteen years
by a range of US and non-US parties, corrects for many of the
methodological limits of existing research. 18 Limits of the prior
studies include (i) an emphasis on lending and corporate
transactions, (ii) reliance on database text searches rather than
hand coding (which risks missing relevant contracts and clauses),
(iii) coding for only a handful of custom terms, and (iv) taking a
static snapshot of contracting practices. 19
The findings reveal that parties routinely alter the
background rules of litigation. 20 It turns out that transactional
lawyers and their clients do share some of the scholarly
enthusiasm for procedural autonomy. 21 Yet they exercise
autonomy only within a limited domain. 22 Contracts almost
uniformly specify the governing law and routinely designate a
litigation or arbitration forum (sometimes with an alternate
forum specified for a subset of disputes). 23 A substantial minority
of contracts shifts the default rule concerning attorney fees. 24 In
addition, contracts with arbitration clauses often modify the
governing rules of the arbitration forum. 25 Again, however, the
modifications are limited in scope. 26 Arbitration clauses
frequently impose arbitrator expertise requirements, specify the
number of arbitrators, or allocate the costs of arbitration. 27 Some
17. See infra Part III.A (detailing use of custom procedure in a sample of
commercial contracts).
18. See infra Part III.A (describing the sample, its limits, and the limits of
existing studies).
19. See infra Part III.A (critiquing previous studies).
20. See infra Figure 1 (finding only 6.5% of contracts lacked any
modification to procedure, excluding choice of law agreements).
21. Infra Figure 1.
22. See infra Table 4 (demonstrating how few contracts show evidence of
detailed procedural customization).
23. Infra Figure 1.
24. See infra Table 4 (finding that 23.9% of contracts adopt a loser-pays
rule for attorney fees).
25. See infra note 280 and accompanying text (finding 92.3% of contracts
with arbitration clauses specify the governing rules).
26. See infra Table 4 (listing potential custom procedural clauses).
27. See infra Table 5 (finding 25.3% of arbitration clauses impose some
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also borrow well-defined rules from other contexts, as when an
arbitration agreement imports the discovery provisions of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 28
What contracts almost never do—in either arbitration or
litigation—is dictate the particulars of pre-trial and trial
practice. 29 In other words, contracts rarely modify rules of
procedure as defined in the classic (if idealized) sense: transsubstantive rules that govern the conduct of litigation (or
arbitration). 30 The vast majority of contracts are silent on matters
of pleading, discovery, evidence, the order and burden of proof,
and related topics. 31 In consequence, these matters are governed
by the procedural rules applicable by default in the forum. 32
The Article’s second contribution is to situate these findings
into the literature on customized adjudication. I do not dwell on
the normative arguments for and against procedural autonomy.
Given how rarely parties modify judicial procedures, such an
inquiry seems premature. 33 Instead, I turn to the central puzzle
kind of expertise requirements, 72.8% address the number of arbitrators, and
52.4% allocate arbitration costs).
28. See infra Table 5 (finding arbitration agreements import the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure’s discovery provisions 7.6% of the time).
29. See infra note 371 and accompanying text (finding little evidence that
parties routinely modify rules of pre-trial and trial procedure).
30. Cf. Robert M. Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a
Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718, 718 (1975) (questioning the utility and
feasibility of genuinely trans-substantive procedural rules); Carl Tobias, The
Transformation of Trans-Substantivity, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1501, 1508
(1992) (noting, but challenging as unattainable, the goal of creating transsubstantive, uniform procedural rules).
31. See infra Table 4 (finding only 2.8% of all contracts expand document
discovery and 1.1% address the burden of proof).
32. See Unbundling Procedure, supra note 15, at 1947 (explaining that if
parties do not opt for their own procedural rules, courts will provide a default
bundle).
33. Objections to procedural autonomy have little force in arbitration,
which is traditionally viewed as a matter of private contract. There is reason for
skepticism in some contexts, such as mass consumer and employment
contracting, but a wide range of procedures should be tolerated in arbitrations
between private commercial entities. As for contracts that anticipate resolving
disputes in litigation, I do not mean to dismiss the objections that some authors
have raised to forum selection clauses and other common modifications to the
rules of litigation. See, e.g., Mullenix, supra note 12, at 297 (critiquing routine
enforcement of forum selection and governing law clauses); Marcus, supra note
12, at 987 (arguing for limits on the ability to specify procedure). Nor do I take a
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raised by the evidence: Why don’t parties exercise their
procedural autonomy?
Three explanations have been offered for the rarity of
customized procedure. 34 One posits that parties do not bargain
over procedural rules for fear of signaling litigiousness or
inability to perform. 35 A second draws a parallel between the
process of contract innovation and product markets, where
innovation often occurs in punctuated bursts. 36 The theory here is
that commercial actors will not embrace novel procedural clauses
until spurred into action by an exogenous event, such as a major
judicial opinion upholding the use of a novel procedural clause. 37
The third explanation emphasizes the costs of identifying and
designing procedural rules. 38 Simply put, parties can capture
many of the benefits of customized procedure by using forum
selection and arbitration clauses to allocate disputes to their
preferred forum(s). 39 Having done so, they may find it too costly
to decide whether they have anything to gain by drafting
additional custom procedures. 40
The findings detailed in this Article complicate each of these
explanations. 41 On the whole, the signaling explanation fares
poorly. 42 Most contracts include at least one clause related to
view on the degree to which parties should be allowed to control judicial
procedure. See, e.g., Dodson, supra note 12 (challenging the assumption that
parties should be allowed to dictate litigation procedure). I simply note that the
rarity of procedural customization diminishes the urgency of the normative
debate.
34. These explanations are described in Parts II.B and C.
35. See infra note 149 and accompanying text (examining the “negative
signal” theory).
36. See Michael L. Tushman & Philip Anderson, Technological
Discontinuities and Organizational Environments, 31 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 439, 460
(1986) (examining patterns of technological change).
37. See Hoffman, supra note 11, at 428–29 (suggesting that a Supreme
Court decision approving use of a procedural modification might prompt
widespread adoption of the clause).
38. See Unbundling Procedure, supra note 15, at 1949–50 (suggesting
parties should choose the arbitration provider or jurisdiction with the most
beneficial bundle of procedures).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See infra Part V (evaluating these theories against the data).
42. See infra Part V.A (arguing that the negative signaling account is hard
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dispute resolution, and the clauses vary from contract to contract
in ways that suggest active negotiation. 43 These facts imply that
dispute resolution is not a taboo subject during negotiations. The
contract-as-product model fares somewhat better, though it too is
hard to square with the sheer variety of dispute resolution
clauses in use today. 44 As for the third explanation, the findings
are generally consistent with the theory that procedural rules can
be prohibitively costly to draft. 45 Yet customized adjudication is
not confined, as this theory arguably implies, to the allocation of
disputes to one or more preferred forums. 46 To the contrary,
parties contract over a much wider range of matters, especially in
arbitration. 47
The question remains, however, why parties do not embrace
customized procedure more fully. Perhaps the most intriguing
finding is that contracts tend towards “coarse” rather than
“granular” modifications to the rules of adjudication. 48 I use these
terms loosely, as a shorthand way to describe the tendency (i) to
embrace clauses that shape the background or incentives of the
adjudicator or broadly alter the parties’ incentives to invest in (or
abuse) the adjudication process, (ii) and to eschew clauses that
dictate what claims the parties may file, when they may file
them, or what pre-trial or trial tactics they may employ. As an
example, contracts routinely adopt a loser-pays rule with respect
to attorney fees, and one consequence of this choice is to reduce
incentives to abuse discovery. 49 Yet, contracts almost never

to square with the fact that contracts frequently modify at least some of the
rules of litigation).
43. Infra Part V.A.
44. See infra Part V.A (questioning whether the contract-as-product model
explains contracting patterns).
45. See infra Part V.B (“On the whole, the findings discussed in Part III are
consistent with the account offered by Drahozal and O’Hara O’Connor . . . .”).
46. See infra Part V.B (describing wider range of procedural
customization).
47. See infra Table 6 (documenting use of additional procedural clauses in
arbitration agreements).
48. See infra Part V.B (distinguishing coarse from granular procedural
modifications).
49. See infra notes 374–379 and accompanying text (elaborating on the
loser-pay rule).
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attempt to prevent discovery abuse more directly, as by including
express limits on the amount of discovery that may be taken. 50
It may be that existing theories can accommodate the
relatively widespread use of “coarse” procedural clauses. Perhaps
the benefits of such clauses are more readily apparent ex ante.
That possibility remains an important area for future research.
What is clear is that customized adjudication exists, but it does
not take the form that many have envisioned.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II explores the benefits
that parties can, at least in theory, capture by tailoring
procedural rules to their liking. Part III then surveys the limited
evidence, which suggests that customized procedure exists largely
in the minds of legal scholars. Part III also explores and critiques
the three prevailing explanations for this apparent disjuncture
between theory and reality. Part IV presents the findings,
focusing primarily on clauses that address procedures in binding
adjudication. However, a variety of contract terms that do not
meet this definition can influence how parties behave in
adjudication—for example, by providing information that
narrows issues or reduces the need for discovery. 51 Thus, Part IV
paints a holistic picture of how commercial contracts address
dispute resolution, including through non-binding mechanisms.
Part V concludes by exploring the implications of these findings
for the literature on customized adjudication.
II. The Advantages and Types of Customized Procedure
The debate over customized procedure has produced a rich
and varied literature. 52 Those inclined to embrace party control
emphasize the benefits of tailored procedural rules, 53 while those
inclined to a more skeptical or agnostic view caution against too50. See infra Table 4 (finding most contracts are silent in regard to
discovery).
51. See infra note 239 and accompanying text (explaining how non-binding
dispute resolution can facilitate agreement over adjudication procedure).
52. For a review, see Hoffman, supra note 11, at 397–402 (focusing,
however, on the literature addressing party control over court proceedings, not
party control over arbitration).
53. See infra Part II.A (explaining these benefits).
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readily allowing private parties to dictate procedure. 54 Most
participants in this debate take for granted that contracting
parties in fact exercise their supposed procedural autonomy. 55
But recent studies have cast doubt on this assumption. 56 This
Part summarizes the benefits attributed to customized procedure
and the prevailing explanations for why parties rarely seem to
draft their own procedural rules. It does not engage with
normative objections to party control, which are muted, and
perhaps absent altogether, if procedural contracting exists only in
the realm of theory. 57
A. Customized Procedure Can Improve Accuracy, Reduce Drafting
and Enforcement Costs, and Reveal Information
One reason parties perform contracts is because of the threat
of legal enforcement. 58 But courts are not perfect, and the
54. See Bone, supra note 8, at 1342–52 (critiquing prevailing objections to
customized procedure but cautioning against enforcement of procedural rules
that interfere with traditional modes of judicial reasoning); Dodge, supra note 8,
at 786 (proposing to deny enforcement to ex ante procedural bargains that
impair substantive rights or that alter procedure in ways that would be
prohibited ex post). See generally Mullenix, supra note 12; Davis & Helen
Hershkoff, supra note 12; Resnik, supra note 12; Marcus, supra note 12; Dodson,
supra note 12.
55. See, e.g., J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private Enforcement
Mechanisms in Public Law, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1137, 1167 (2012) (referring
to “the systematic customization . . . of procedural mechanisms”); Dodge, supra
note 8, at 745 (“[S]ophisticated commercial parties regularly modify the rules of
civil procedure and evidence.”); Mullenix, supra note 12, at 296 (noting the
“quiet revolution” by which contract terms have displaced “long-standing
jurisdictional and conflict-of-laws rules”); Marcus, supra note 12, at 974–75
(referencing the “ubiquity” of customized procedural clauses); Dodson, supra
note 12, at 3 (noting the “recent trend of customized litigation”); see also Bone,
supra note 8, at 1342 (emphasizing the scant case law addressing many custom
procedural clauses).
56. See infra Part III.A (reviewing studies finding limited evidence of
procedural customization).
57. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (explaining how the rarity of
procedural contracting renders this debate premature).
58. See Hylton, supra note 7, at 209, 217–20, 223–26 (noting that choice of
dispute resolution methods can provide deterrence benefits). One should not, of
course, overstate the importance of contracts, or legal enforcement, to
commercial relations. See Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in
Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55, 59 (1963) (famously
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prospect of error can undermine the incentive to perform. 59 Recall
the example of the contract for the sale of a technologically
advanced product. 60 At the time of the contract, Seller and Buyer
can anticipate disputes over product quality, and both parties
have reason to want these disputes resolved accurately. A
precisely drafted contract would minimize the risk of error, 61 but
Buyer cannot provide specifications in advance, and, in any
event, the product’s technical complexity may make it hard for a
non-specialist to tell whether Seller has performed or breached.
On these assumptions, customized procedure promises improved
accuracy. 62 For example, if the parties believe an arbitrator can
more accurately detect or remedy breach, they can include an
arbitration clause in the contract. 63 If they prefer litigation but
question the fact-finding ability of jurors, they might agree to
waive their right to a jury trial. 64
Customized procedure can do more than increase accuracy. 65
All else equal, parties should prefer to minimize dispute
resolution costs—for example, by voluntarily exchanging relevant
information and foregoing unnecessary discovery—and they may

documenting that detailed planning and legal sanctions often play a relatively
minor role in business relations).
59. Contractualizing Procedure, supra note 1, at 22–23. This is not to say
that increased accuracy in adjudication is always valuable. See, e.g., Louis
Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis, 23 J.
LEGAL STUD. 307, 312–23 (1994) (explaining how the value of accuracy is a
function of the extent to which parties are informed ex ante). Adjudicator error,
moreover, is not an either/or proposition, and the relative likelihood of error can
have complicated incentive effects. See generally Hadfield, supra note 3.
60. Supra Part I.
61. Contractualizing Procedure, supra note 1, at 21; Scott & Triantis, supra
note 2, at 822–23.
62. See Contractualizing Procedure, supra note 1, at 21 (noting how custom
procedural can increase adjudication accuracy).
63. See Drahozal & Hylton, supra note 7, at 550 (“Contracting parties can
choose, before any disputes arise, whether to resolve all or a subset of their
disputes in court or through arbitration.”); Brousseau et al., supra note 2, at
211–12 (discussing dispute resolution mechanisms).
64. Contractualizing Procedure, supra note 1, at 21.
65. See Gerhard Wagner, The Dispute Resolution Market, 62 BUFF. L. REV.
1085, 1118–27 (2014) (identifying both increased accuracy and enforceability of
judgments, and exploring the trade-off between accuracy and enforcement
costs).
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sacrifice some accuracy to attain this goal. 66 Once a dispute
occurs, however, each has an incentive to withhold information
and exploit discovery devices. 67 In our hypothetical sales contract,
Seller holds most of the information relevant to its efforts to
perform and may be tempted to withhold unfavorable evidence. 68
For its part, Buyer may try to gain an edge by using discovery
devices to increase Seller’s litigation costs. 69 Lawyers can
mitigate these tendencies but also exacerbate them. 70 Again,
customized procedure promises a solution. To reduce the risk of
discovery abuse, the parties might agree to limit their access to
discovery. 71 The literature gives few concrete suggestions for how
they might do so, 72 but one can imagine firm limits on the
66. See id. (exploring the trade-off between accuracy and enforcement
costs).
67. See Contractualizing Procedure, supra note 1, at 13 (“[A]t the
post-dispute stage a litigant may exercise her procedural rights to impose risks
and costs on her counterparty, even though both would have preferred to forgo
such opportunities at the time of contracting.”); Scott & Triantis, supra note 2,
at 828–29 (“At the time of the trial, the parties are engaged in splitting a fixed
gain or loss with little, if any prospective efficiency value.”); Bruce L. Hay,
Procedural Justice—Ex Ante vs. Ex Post, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1803, 1811–39 (1997)
(explaining post-dispute incentive structure).
68. On the difficulties in securing cooperation between litigants and the
circumstances in which lawyers and law firms might enable cooperation, see
Ronald J. Gilson and Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents:
Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509,
512 (1994).
69. Contractualizing Procedure, supra note 1, at 16; see also Martin H.
Redish, Electronic Discovery and the Litigation Matrix, 51 DUKE L.J. 561, 603
(2001) (“[T]he bigger the expense to be borne by the opponent, the bigger the
incentive to make the request.”).
70. See, e.g., Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 68, at 511–12 (exploring
lawyers as potentially aggressive or cooperative agents of a client); see also
Rachel Croson & Robert H. Mnookin, Does Disputing Through Agents Enhance
Cooperation?: Experimental Evidence, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 331, 342 (1997)
(presenting experimental evidence consistent with the claim that lawyers can
mitigate conflict between litigants); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the
Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 113, 170–73 (1996) (using the
framing theory of litigation to explore the potential role of lawyers in reducing
litigation costs).
71. See, e.g., Contractualizing Procedure, supra note 1, at 17–18 (“Litigants
can lower their costs by cooperatively . . . refraining from discovery abuse . . . .”);
Dodge, supra note 8 at 746–47 (“[C]ontracts typically limit rather than expand
discovery, using the shared ex ante preference for minimized litigation costs to
prevent ex post defection and escalation of resource investment.”).
72. Kapeliuk and Klement identify contracts that include discovery
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number of depositions 73 or restrictions on discovery of
electronically stored information. 74
Customized procedure also allows parties to capture benefits
during contract formation. This is so for at least two reasons.
First, parties who trust the adjudicator to reach an accurate
result may formulate their primary obligations less precisely,
thereby economizing on drafting costs. 75 Assume Seller and
Buyer expect to arbitrate before an industry expert. Given the
arbitrator’s familiarity with industry practices, the parties may
forego elaborate contract drafting and instead simply require
Seller to use “commercially reasonable efforts.” Second, some
parties may use customized procedure to send credible
negotiating signals about reliability, propensity for litigation, or
other matters. 76 For instance, Seller may be a new entrant to a
market populated by established companies. With no reputation
for reliability, how can Seller convince Buyer to trust it?
Conceivably, Seller could signal confidence in its product by
offering to bear the burden of proof in any lawsuit for breach. 77
restrictions in arbitration, but they acknowledge finding no examples of
contracts that limit discovery in the absence of an arbitration clause.
Contractualizing Procedure, supra note 1, at 10.
73. Federal procedural rules allow ten per side, although the court may
alter this limit. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(a).
74. For example, parties might specify ex ante that a particular kind of
electronically-stored information is not reasonably accessible. FED. R. CIV. P.
26(b)(2)(B).
75. See Scott & Triantis, supra note 2 at 856–57 (discussing this trade-off
between front-end and back-end contracting costs).
76. See Contractualizing Procedure, supra note 1, at 24–25 (suggesting that
parties can signal private information by agreeing to custom procedural
clauses). The insight relates to the familiar contracts literature on default rules,
much of which has been occupied by the question of whether and when the law
should adopt defaults designed to promote pre-contractual disclosure. See
generally Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989); Jason Scott Johnston,
Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100
YALE L.J. 615 (1990); Barry E. Adler, The Questionable Ascent of Hadley v.
Baxendale, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1547 (1999); Omri Ben-Shahar & Lisa Bernstein,
The Secrecy Interest in Contract Law, 109 YALE L.J. 1885 (2000).
77. Section 2-607(4) of the Uniform Commercial Code assigns to the buyer
the burden of proving breach with respect to goods accepted. U.C.C. § 2-607(4)
(AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977). On the context-dependent incentive
effects of burden of proof assignments, see generally Scott & Triantis, supra
note 2, at 860–66.
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Or, to borrow an example from another context, Daphna Kapeliuk
and Alon Klement suggest that a prospective tenant might signal
reliability by agreeing to let the landlord quickly obtain
provisional relief in the event of a default. 78
Customized procedure offers benefits beyond those noted
above, 79 including greater privacy and confidentiality. 80 It bears
repeating that the literature is concerned with the ability to
capture these benefits by ex ante agreement. 81 Ideally, parties
would wait for a dispute to arise before negotiating appropriate
procedures. If no dispute happens, they will save negotiating time
and expense. If there is a dispute, they will understand its
parameters and be better positioned to identify cost-effective
procedures. The problem with deferred negotiations, however, is
that the parties’ interests diverge ex post. 82 At least between
sophisticated parties, then, courts arguably should be receptive to
78. Contractualizing Procedure, supra note 1, at 24–25.
79. The magnitude of these benefits will vary by context. For instance,
parties to international contracts may assign greater value to the ability to
control procedure. See S.I. Strong, Limits of Procedural Choice of Law, 39
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1027, 1039–48 (2014).
80. Privacy and confidentiality are often cited as benefits of arbitration. See
Sarah Rudolph Cole & Kristen M. Blankley, Arbitration, in THE HANDBOOK OF
DISPUTE RESOLUTION 318, 318–19 (Michael L. Moffitt & Robert C. Bordone eds.,
2005). This is not to say that arbitration guarantees confidentiality or that there
is no public interest in what happens in arbitration. See, e.g., Amy Schmitz,
Untangling the Privacy Paradox in Arbitration, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1211, 1211
(2006) (clarifying the distinction between privacy and confidentiality); Richard
C. Reuben, Confidentiality in Arbitration: Beyond the Myth, 54 U. KAN. L. REV.
1255, 1257 (2006) (exploring the discoverability and admissibility of
communications made in arbitration); Jack J. Coe, Jr., Transparency in the
Resolution of Investor-State Disputes-Adoption, Adaptation and NAFTA
Leadership, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1339, 1340 (2006) (discussing evolution of
transparency policies in arbitration under the North American Free Trade
Agreement); Catherine A. Rogers, Transparency in International Commercial
Arbitration, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1301, 1302 (2006) (exploring transparency in
international commercial arbitration); see also S.I. Strong, Research in
International Commercial Arbitration: Special Skills, Special Sources, 20 AM.
REV. INT’L ARB. 119, 142–45, 150–56 (2009) (discussing confidentiality of arbitral
proceedings and awards in international commercial arbitration and explaining
the relevance of awards and scholarship as sources of law).
81. See Contractualizing Procedure, supra note 1, at 16–19 (discussing
barriers to contracting over procedure ex post).
82. See Contractualizing Procedure, supra note 1, at 16–19 (explaining that
removal of uncertainty post-dispute makes cooperation less likely).
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ex ante procedural bargains, as it may be difficult for parties to
agree on optimal procedures once a dispute has arisen. 83
B.

The Many (Potential) Forms of Customized Procedure

Parties rarely need to design a dispute resolution process
from scratch:
[C]ourts and arbitration institutions provide bundles of
services to their customers—in this case, bundles of dispute
resolution procedures to the parties in a dispute. Courts
provide the default bundle, but parties can opt instead for
arbitral procedural bundles that vary according to the
applicable arbitration rules chosen by the parties. 84

The concept is straightforward. Parties who do not predesignate
the forum will wind up in court if they have a dispute, and their
silence constitutes an implicit acceptance of the bundled rules
applicable in the relevant jurisdiction(s). 85 Those who prefer the
rules of a particular litigation or arbitration forum can agree to
resolve disputes there. 86 If they do not like all of the designated
83. Changing the Litigation Game, supra note 10, at 1483–84; Wagner,
supra note 65, at 1101. But see Robert G. Bone, Agreeing to Fair Process: The
Problem with Contractarian Theories of Procedural Fairness, 83 B.U. L. REV.
485, 526–29 (2003) (critiquing overly sharp distinctions between ex ante and ex
post agreements over litigation process). A similar barrier may impede ex post
procedural contracting in consumer and employment relationships. See, e.g.,
Scott Baker, A Risk-Based Approach to Mandatory Arbitration, 83 OR. L. REV.
861, 895–96 (2004) (explaining difficulties of agreeing to arbitration ex post);
Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate Over
Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 559,
567–68 (2001) (same). Of course, courts more actively regulate such contracts
under unconscionability and other doctrines. The argument for procedural
customization assumes that the parties’ bargain is otherwise enforceable. Even
then, mass consumer and employment contracts may merit different treatment.
See generally Dodge, supra note 8, at 754–64.
84. Unbundling Procedure, supra note 15, at 1947.
85. Without an exclusive forum selection clause, parties cannot be sure of
the forum in advance. Case-filing decisions are constrained, of course, by rules
governing jurisdiction and venue and are subject to a host of other rules
allocating decision-making authority across jurisdictional lines. For example,
courts faced with duplicative lawsuits often defer to the first-filed action. See,
e.g., Semmes Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 429 F.2d 1197, 1102–03 (2d Cir.
1970) (recognizing the priority afforded to the suit filed first).
86. See Dodge, supra note 8, at 739–43 (discussing forum selection);
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forum’s rules, the parties can tailor them further by drafting
additional, customized procedures, much like the buyer of an offthe-rack suit can improve the fit by paying for minor alterations.
(Of course, parties can design dispute resolution mechanisms
from scratch, or pay lawyers to do so, just as people can sew their
own suit or visit bespoke Saville Row tailors.)
For example, a forum selection clause requiring litigation in
New York incorporates a bundle of rules that includes (for state
law causes of action) that state’s conflict of laws rules. 87 These
can be uncertain in application, so the parties might clarify the
law governing their primary obligations with a choice of law
clause. 88 They might also alter forum rules allocating fact-finding
duties between judge and jury—say, by waiving the right to a
jury trial. 89 If they deem a subset of disputes more suitable for
arbitration, they might further add a limited arbitration clause
designating their preferred arbitration forum for this subset.
Clauses that send a limited subset of disputes to arbitration are
sometimes called “carve-ins.” 90
Alternatively, assume that contracting parties want to
arbitrate most disputes. Rather than draft their own code of
arbitration procedure, they designate an off-the-rack set of rules,
such as the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American
Arbitration Association (AAA). 91 If the AAA rules are inadequate
in some respect—for example, by not requiring the arbitrator to
have relevant industry expertise—the parties can add a clause
Unbundling Procedure, supra note 15, at 1–2 (same). This assumes subject
matter jurisdiction in the case of judicial forums.
87. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 2 (AM. LAW INST. 1971);
see also Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941) (requiring
federal courts to apply the conflicts of laws rules of the state where they sit in
diversity cases).
88. See generally Juliet P. Kostritsky, What Lawyers Say Determines
Choice of Law in Merger Agreements: A Complex Truth (Case Res. Paper Series
in Legal Stud., Working Paper 2014–10 (rev), 2014) (surveying lawyers
concerning choice of law in merger agreements).
89. The source and content of these rules will depend on whether the
litigation is in state or federal court.
90. Unbundling Procedure, supra note 15, at 1950 n.23.
91. Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures, AM. ARB.
ASS’N (Oct. 1, 2013), https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowProperty?nodeId=/UCM/
ADRSTG_004103 (last visited Nov. 11, 2015) [hereinafter Commercial
Arbitration Rules] (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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imposing this requirement. 92 The parties also might want to
litigate a subset of disputes, such as demands for preliminary
injunctions or other provisional remedies. They can accomplish
this with a so-called “carve-out” exempting such questions from
arbitration. 93
Conceptually, it may help to group custom procedural clauses
according to function. Some designate a preferred set of bundled
rules for some or all disputes. These include forum selection
clauses, arbitration clauses that designate an off-the-rack set of
institutional rules, 94 and clauses that specify the governing law. 95
Carve-outs and carve-ins also fall into this group, as these clauses
designate a forum for a subset of claims or remedies. 96
Other clauses target the adjudicator’s identity, expertise, or
incentives. Here, parties who expect to litigate have relatively
little freedom. Courts typically enforce jury trial waivers 97 and
often agree to various non-traditional forms of judicial
involvement, such as the entry of consent decrees. 98 But courts
92. AAA rules create a process for selecting an arbitrator but do not
generally require arbitrators to have industry expertise. See id. at 15 (providing
procedures for appointing an arbitrator in the event the parties cannot agree).
93. See Unbundling Procedure, supra note 15, at 1957–59. Here is a carveout: “Any dispute, except a dispute involving infringement of Third Party
intellectual property rights or any intellectual property rights owned or
controlled by a party, shall be submitted to arbitration . . . .” License,
Development, Supply, and Distribution Agreement dated Dec. 11, 2006 between
Immunicon Corporation and Diagnostic Hybrids, Inc. ¶ 14 (Dec. 11, 2006) (on
file with author).
94. If parties do not specify (or create) procedures to govern the
arbitration, then the arbitrator will have nearly unfettered discretion to
determine appropriate procedure.
95. See, e.g., Contractualizing Procedure, supra note 1, at 7 (noting
prevalence of clauses designating the governing law); Noyes, supra note 8, at
599–601 (discussing forum selection clauses).
96. Drahozal & O’Hara O’Connor refer to carve-outs and carve-ins as
“unbundled” procedure. Drahozal & O’Hara O’Connor, Supra note 15, at 1991.
In a sense this is right, for these clauses exempt claims or remedies from the
bundled rules that would otherwise apply. Yet, for this subset, carve-outs and
carve-ins simply replace the default bundle with different bundled rules. I do
not believe anything turns on the distinction, as Drahozal and O’Hara O’Connor
are interested primarily in whether parties who have designated a forum
engage in further customization.
97. Contractualizing Procedure, supra note 1, at 7; Dodge, supra note 8, at
747; Bone, supra note 8, at 1348–49.
98. See, e.g., Sarah Rudolph Cole, Managerial Litigants? The Overlooked
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are public institutions; litigants cannot instruct public officials
how to act 99 or demand a judge with desirable characteristics. 100
Parties who agree to arbitrate have more freedom. 101 By
definition, arbitration involves a private adjudicator selected and
paid by the parties. Because arbitrators are market actors who
compete for business, their incentives necessarily differ from
those of judges. 102 Arbitration also differs from litigation in that
the parties can specify arbitrator characteristics and create
custom incentive structures. For example, parties can insist on an
arbitrator with industry expertise. 103 They can require a threearbitrator panel, thereby forcing each member not only to reach a
decision but to persuade at least one other panelist. 104 Parties can
Problem of Party Autonomy in Dispute Resolution, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1199, 1207–
20 (2000) (exploring judicial treatment of consent decrees).
99. See Owen M. Fiss, Comment, Against Settlement, 93 YALE. L.J. 1073,
1085 (1984) (noting that judges do not derive their authority from private
contractual agreements).
100. Judges on a court may share attributes or follow consistent casemanagement practices. If these differ across jurisdictions, a forum selection
clause allows parties (indirectly) to select between judicial models. But parties
still cannot specify the judge’s background or easily adjust the judge’s
incentives. See Contractualizing Procedure, supra note 1, at 29–34 (explaining
that the incentives facing judges are shaped by institutional mandates and not
market pressures). Arbitration offers much greater flexibility. See, e.g.,
Distribution Agreement dated Aug. 12, 2009 between MaxLinear, Inc. and
Lestina, Int’l Ltd., at ¶ 15.8 (“The arbitrator will have at least 15 years of
appropriate experience in the semiconductor industry and be independent of the
parties.”) (on file with author).
101. See Bone, supra note 8, at 1386 (discussing the wide latitude parties
have in shaping the arbitration process).
102. See, e.g., Orley Ashenfelter, Arbitration and the Negotiation Process, 77
AM. ECON. REV., May 1987, at 343 (suggesting that a successful arbitrator must
“provide decisions that are forecasts of the decisions other arbitrators will make
in similar situations”). This is not to say that judges do not try to accommodate
lawyers who make case-filing decisions or otherwise behave as if competing for
business, only that judges are insulated from market forces to a greater extent
than arbitrators. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices
Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 4–7
(1993) (exploring the incentive structure of federal judges).
103. See Contractualizing Procedure, supra note 1, at 26 (noting that parties
may choose expert arbitrators when disputes require scientific or technical
expertise).
104. On panel dynamics in arbitration, see, e.g., Daphna Kapeliuk, Collegial
Games: Analyzing the Effect of Panel Composition on Outcome in Investment
Arbitration, 31 REV. LITIG. 267, 292–97 (2012) (focusing on investment
arbitration); Alan Scott Rau, Integrity in Private Judging, 38 S. TEX. L. REV.
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even dictate the method of reaching a decision. For example, in
“final offer arbitration”—sometimes called “baseball arbitration”
due to its association with salary disputes in professional
baseball—the arbitrator must choose between resolutions proposed
by the parties.105
Other clauses directly alter litigation costs and payouts.
Examples include clauses that allocate responsibility for attorney
fees,106 litigation costs, and arbitration-specific costs such as
administrative fees, facility rental charges, and arbitrator
compensation.107 Finally, some clauses specify the manner and
timing of initiating a claim, the rules of discovery and other pretrial processes, and the rules of procedure and evidence at trial (or
the merits hearing in arbitration). 108 Examples include clauses
that reduce or expand the time for filing claims,109 establish a
method for serving process, 110 specify alternate pleading
standards,111 restrict or expand discovery, 112 allocate burdens of
485, 497–98 (1997) (discussing the process of compromise resulting from partyappointed arbitrators on a three-arbitrator panel—at least where party
appointees are not required to be neutral).
105. See, e.g., Michael Carrell & Richard Bales, Considering Final Offer
Arbitration to Resolve Public Sector Impasses in Times of Concession
Bargaining, 28 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 17–22 (2013) (discussing salary
arbitration in Major League Baseball).
106. See Contractualizing Procedure, supra note 1, at 8 (discussing
symmetric and asymmetric approaches to allocating attorney fees); Dodge,
supra note 8, at 748 (same).
107. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration Costs and Contingent Fee
Contracts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 729, 736–42 (2006) (discussing the AAA’s fee
structure).
108. Again, and in keeping with the literature, I use the term “procedural”
to refer to a wide range of clauses that alter traditional rules governing
litigation.
109. See Contractualizing Procedure, supra note 1, at 7 (describing how
parties can waive statute of limitations defenses); Dodge, supra note 8, at 746.
(same).
110. Contractualizing Procedure, supra note 1, at 7.
111. See, e.g., Daphna Kapeliuk & Alon Klement, Contracting Around
Twombly, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 1 (2010) (exploring the possibility that contracting
parties might adopt the pre-Twombly pleading standard).
112. See, e.g., Moffitt, supra note 10, at 469–72 (exploring customized
discovery procedures); Dodge, supra note 8, at 746–47 (same); Bone, supra note
8, at 1346–47 (same); Contractualizing Procedure, supra note 1, at 17–18
(same).
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proof,113 or adjust evidentiary rules. 114 For instance, parties might
agree to waive hearsay objections 115 or objections as to the
authenticity of a document. 116 Clauses in this category tend to
modify rules that are procedural in the classic, trans-substantive
sense. 117
These categories are stylized and overlapping, but they
usefully highlight the central function of each clause. For
example, parties who agree to arbitrate may expect this choice to
reduce the expense of discovery118 and to do away with the
hearsay rule. 119 However, the decision to arbitrate may or may
not produce these incidental benefits. 120 Likewise, parties who
agree to a loser-pays rule with respect to attorney fees may
expect this to reduce discovery costs, but this may not prove true
in all cases. The categories emphasize the functions necessarily
accomplished by each clause.

113. Scott & Triantis, supra note 2, at 857–58, n.129.
114. Bone, supra note 8, at 1349; Noyes, supra note 8, at 607–08; Moffitt,
supra note 10, at 472–75.
115. Noyes, supra note 8, at 607–08.
116. See Hoffman, supra note 11, at 417 (discussing self-authenticating
contracts).
117. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (noting rarity of clauses
modifying procedural rules).
118. Unbundling Procedure, supra note 15, at 1953–54.
119. The presumption is that the rules of evidence do not apply in
arbitration, although institutional rules often leave this to the arbitrator’s
discretion. See, e.g., Commercial Arbitration Rules, supra note 91, at 23
(“Conformity to the legal rules of evidence shall not be necessary.”).
120. See id. (“The arbitrator shall determine the admissibility, relevance,
and materiality of the evidence offered.”).
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Table 1. Categories of Customized Procedure,
by Function, with Examples
1. Selects Bundled Rules
• Forum Selection
• Arbitration
• Choice of Law
• Carve-out
• Carve-in
2. Adjusts Adjudicator Identity and Incentives
• Jury Trial Waiver
• Arbitrator Expertise
• Arbitrator Number
• Decision Method (e.g., Final Offer Arbitration)
3. Alters Adjudication Costs/Payouts
• Allocates Attorney Fees
• Allocates Litigation or Arbitration Costs
4. Addresses Timing, Procedure, or Evidence
• Alters Statute of Limitations
• Specifies Pleading Standard
• Allocates Burden of Proof
• Service of Process Method
• Restricts or Expands Discovery
• Alters Evidentiary Rules

III. Why Don’t Parties Exercise Their Procedural Freedom?
The discussion thus far has emphasized the benefits
attributed to customized procedure. As noted, however, many
view with skepticism the prospect that parties might dictate
adjudication procedure. 121 This is especially so for mass consumer
and employment contracts, which present the risk that
businesses will draft one-sided procedures that effectively bestow
immunity from liability. 122 But skepticism about customized
121. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (noting skeptical views about
party-controlled procedure).
122. See, e.g., Dodge, supra note 8 at 757–64 (emphasizing information
asymmetries and other bargaining defects in form contracts with individuals);
Moffitt, supra note 10, at 517–18 (expressing similar concerns). A voluminous
literature critically examines party control over the arbitration process.
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procedure also extends to arms-length contracts between
commercial parties. 123 At the extreme, some argue, party control
over litigation procedure may “create[] risks to the institution of
adjudication itself.” 124 For present purposes, however, normative
questions about customized procedure must take a back seat to
descriptive ones. There is a consensus that customized procedure
is widespread. 125 But the limited available evidence suggests that
this is not so. 126 As David Hoffman notes, the “grand cathedral of
privatized civil procedure” may have a flimsy foundation in
fact. 127
A. The Limited Evidence of Procedural Customization
Most contracts are private documents. 128 Researchers
interested in contract terms therefore tend to rely on a limited
number of publicly available contracts repositories, including
Examples include David Horton, Arbitration as Delegation, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV.
437, 460–68 (2011); Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It
Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631, 1640–42 (2005) (identifying problems with the
manner in which many consumer and employment arbitration agreements are
formed and with the terms of the resulting arbitration process).
123. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 8, at 1362–68 (discounting many common
objections to party control); Dodge, supra note 8, at 754–63 (exploring separately
procedural autonomy in commercial and consumer contracts); Mullenix, supra
note 12, at 339–47 (objecting to elevating contract rules over jurisdictional and
other principles); Moffitt, supra note 10, at 513–19 (exploring objections to
customized litigation). For a related inquiry into the normative questions raised
by party control over judicial procedures, see generally Cole, supra note 98
(discussing managerial litigants who demand non-traditional forms of judicial
involvement).
124. Bone, supra note 8, at 1398. The concern is that radical departures
from normal judicial processes might compromise the commitment of judges to
traditional forms of judicial reasoning. On other normative objections to party
control, see infra Part V.
125. See Hoffman, supra note 11, at 392–93 (stating the common perception
that customized procedure “is on the verge of being ‘systematic’”).
126. See id. at 393–94 (noting there is little evidence of widespread
procedural customization).
127. Id. at 394.
128. There is nevertheless a growing empirical literature studying
contracts, how they are produced, and how they are viewed and implemented by
parties. For a literature review, see generally Zev J. Eigen, Empirical Studies of
Contract, 8 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 291 (2012).
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material contracts included with Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) 129 and franchise agreements filed with state
regulators. 130
Despite these limits, the evidence suggests that even
sophisticated commercial actors rarely customize the
adjudication process in any detail. Some clauses are relatively
common. Most notably, several studies document nearubiquitous use of choice of law clauses, although these studies
tend to involve merger agreements—high-value transactions in
which lawyers are particularly attentive to the governing law. 131
Other studies find forum selection clauses in at least a
substantial minority of contracts. 132 The same is true for
129. See, e.g., Unbundling Procedure, supra note 15, at 1972 (compiling a
sample of a variety of contracts filed with the SEC); Hoffman, supra note 11, at
403–16 (same); Erin O’Hara O’Connor et al., Customizing Employment
Arbitration, 98 IOWA L. REV. 133, 136–37 (2012) (studying CEO employment
contracts); Christopher R. Drahozal & Stephen J. Ware, Why Do Businesses Use
(or Not Use) Arbitration Clauses?, 25 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 433, 449–67
(2010) (analyzing material contracts filed with the SEC); Theodore Eisenberg &
Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight from Arbitration: An Empirical Study of Ex Ante
Arbitration Clauses in the Contracts of Publicly Held Companies, 56 DEPAUL L.
REV. 335 (2007) [hereinafter The Flight from Arbitration] (same); Theodore
Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, Ex Ante Choices of Law and Forum: An Empirical
Analysis of Corporate Merger Agreements, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1975, 983–94 (2006)
[hereinafter, Ex Ante Choices] (analyzing merger agreements filed with the
SEC).
130. See, e.g., Peter B. Rutledge & Christopher R. Drahozal, “Sticky”
Arbitration Clauses?: The Use of Arbitration Clauses After Concepcion and
Amex, 67 VAND. L. REV. 955, 987–1011 (2014); Drahozal & Hylton, supra note 7,
at 550. Other studies use survey methods to identify contracting practices. See,
e.g., Brousseau et al., supra note 2 (2007). Additional studies focus on credit
card agreements or other consumer contracts, but these are outside the scope of
this project. See, e.g., Christopher R. Drahozal & Peter B. Rutledge, Arbitration
Clauses in Credit Card Agreements: An Empirical Study, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 536, 539 (2012).
131. See, e.g., Ex Ante Choices, supra note 129, at 1987 tbl.2 (all merger
agreements in sample designate governing law); Matthew D. Cain & Stephen M.
Davidoff, Delaware’s Competitive Reach, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 92, 105
Panel C (2012) (same); see also Hoffman, supra note 11, at 410 (finding over
1,000 contracts each year in text-based search of SEC material contracts); Giles
Cuniberti, The International Market for Contracts (University of Luxembourg
Law Working Paper No. 2014-12, 2014) (studying commercial contracts used by
parties to ICC arbitrations and finding that over 80% of contracts included a
choice of law clause).
132. See, e.g., Cain & Davidoff, supra note 131, at 105, Panel C (2012)
(finding that 87.3% of a sample of merger agreements included forum selection
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arbitration clauses, 133 many of which include “carve-outs” allowing
the parties to go to court to litigate a subset of claims, such as
requests for preliminary injunctive relief. 134 Finally—although the
evidence is scant here—recent studies suggest that commercial
contracts often adopt a loser-pays rule regarding attorney fees 135
clause); Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight to New York: An
Empirical Study of Choice of Law and Choice of Forum Clauses in Publicly-Held
Companies’ Contracts, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1475, 1504 tbl.11 (2009) [hereinafter,
The Flight to NY] (finding that 38.9% of a sample of commercial contracts
included choice of forum clause); Ex Ante Choices, supra note 129, at 1987
(finding that 52.5% of a sample of merger agreements included choice of forum
clause); see also Hoffman, supra note 11, at 407–08 (concluding based on text
search of SEC filings that “a plurality of contracts choose forum”).
133. See, e.g., O’Hara O’Connor et al., supra note 129, at 161 tbl.1 (2012)
(finding that 51.5% of a sample of CEO employment contracts required
arbitration of some or all disputes); Unbundling Procedure, supra note 15, at
1973 (finding that 47.5% of a sample of technology contracts included an
arbitration clause, again with substantial variation across contract type);
Drahozal & Ware, supra note 129, at 465–66 tbl.4 (reporting arbitration usage
of 47.6% and 71%, respectively, in domestic and international joint venture
agreements); Drahozal & Hylton, supra note 7, at 566 (reporting that 34 of 75
franchisors included arbitration clauses in their contracts); Drahozal &
Rutledge, supra note 130, at 29–32 (finding more widespread use of arbitration
in two samples of franchise contracts—e.g., in a sample of agreements filed by
68 franchisors between 1999 and 2013, arbitration clauses appeared between
39.7% and 45.6% of the time); Brousseau et al., supra note 2, at 218 (finding
that 62% of a sample of technology licensing agreements implement an
alternative dispute mechanism, primarily arbitration). Eisenberg and Miller
find much lower rates of arbitration overall; only around 11% of their sample of
commercial contracts included an arbitration clause. See The Flight From
Arbitration, supra note 129, at 351 tbl.2. For a variety of reasons, however, their
sample may understate the prevalence of arbitration clauses. See Drahozal &
Ware, supra note 129, at 449–67 (noting that Eisenberg and Miller did not
sample joint venture agreements, which are contracts more likely to contain
arbitration agreements).
134. For example, O’Hara O’Connor et al. found such carve-outs in nearly
half of a sample of CEO employment contracts. O’Hara O’Connor et al., supra
note 129, at 167–68. Likewise, Drahozal and O’Hara O’Connor found routine use
of carve-outs in arbitration clauses in samples of joint venture, technology, and
franchise agreements. Unbundling Procedure, supra note 15, at 21–31; see also
Christopher R. Drahozal & Quentin R. Wittrock, Is There a Flight from
Arbitration?, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 71, 113–15 (2008) (finding frequent use of
carve outs in franchise agreements).
135. Under the default rule—the so-called “American rule”—each side pays
its own lawyer’s fees. See, e.g., Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of
Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical Overview, 1982 DUKE L.J. 651, 651 (1982). The
so-called “English rule” requires the losing party to pay the winner’s reasonable
attorney fees. Eisenberg and Miller find no preference between the rules in a
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and (much more rarely) agree to waive the right to a jury
trial. 136
This brief summary obscures a great deal of variance across
different types of commercial contract (e.g., domestic or
international). For example, arbitration clauses appear more
frequently when the contract involves an international
transaction. 137 The prevalence of jury trial waivers likewise
varies dramatically across contract type. 138 Nevertheless, the
broad patterns are clear. Except for the clauses listed above,
commercial contracts rarely include custom procedural clauses. 139
For example, in a study of arbitration clauses in CEO
employment contracts, O’Hara O’Connor et al. found that most
contracts selected a set of institutional arbitration rules and
addressed the question of arbitration costs. 140 But relatively few
contracts—typically between 1–10%—addressed aspects of the
arbitration, such as discovery rights, the availability of punitive

large sample of commercial contracts. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P.
Miller, The English Versus the American Rule on Attorney Fees: An Empirical
Study of Public Company Contracts, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 327, 350–52 (2013)
(finding that 37.1% of the contracts in their sample adopted the American rule,
while 36.4% adopted the English rule). Because they include contracts that do
not mention attorney fees in their count of contracts that adopt the default
American rule, it is not clear what proportion of contracts in their sample
expressly addresses the subject of attorney fees. Nevertheless, their data make
clear that it is at least a substantial minority, and probably a clear majority.
136. Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Do Juries Add Value?:
Evidence from an Empirical Study of Jury Trial Waiver Clauses in Large
Corporate Contracts, (2006) CORNELL L. FAC. PUBL’NS paper 67, at 3 (finding that
only about 20% of 2,800 commercial contracts contained jury trial waivers,
although also finding substantial variance across contract type, ranging from
1.9% to 64.5%).
137. See, e.g., The Flight From Arbitration, supra note 129, at 350–53
(finding that arbitration clauses appear nearly twice as often when the contract
includes an international party).
138. See Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 136, at 17 tbl.2 (contrasting the low
prevalence of jury trial waivers in employment and bond indenture contracts
with the high prevalence of jury trial waivers in credit commitments and
security agreements).
139. See O’Hara O’Connor et al., supra note 129, at 137 (noting that, beyond
basic clauses determining the governing rules and arbitration association,
customization is relatively rare).
140. See id. at 162–66 (finding that over half of the CEO employment
contracts in the sample expressly allocated arbitration costs).

1892

72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1865 (2015)

damages, or the right to appeal the arbitrator’s award. 141
Likewise, using broad text searches of material contracts filed
with the SEC, David Hoffman looked for evidence of procedural
customization, focusing on contracts without arbitration
clauses. 142 Except for the relatively common clauses noted above,
he found little evidence of customized procedure. 143 In his
estimate, for example, clauses allocating the burden of proof
appear in no more than 1–2% of contracts in the EDGAR
database. 144
These should be understood as preliminary, tentative
findings. The number of relevant studies is quite small, and most
report the prevalence of only one or two custom terms. As
described below, moreover, the studies are subject to a variety of
methodological limits. 145 Nevertheless, the apparent rarity of
customized procedure has shifted the terms of debate. The
important question, it seems, is why sophisticated commercial
actors do not exploit their freedom to adjust procedural rules.
What explains the disjuncture between the theory and the
(apparent) reality of customized procedure?
B.

Efforts to Explain the Rarity of Customized Procedure

The theoretical and empirical study of contract innovation is
a relatively new field. 146 Even when limited to commercial
transactions between sophisticated actors—and ignoring the
definitional questions associated with these terms—the story of
how contracts are produced and evolve is a complex one. The
141. Id. at 166–67 tbl.5.
142. See Hoffman, supra note 11, at 395 (noting the analytical difference
between dictating judicial procedures and opting out of litigation altogether).
143. See id. (summarizing findings).
144. Id. at 420.
145. See infra Part III.C (discussing methodological limits).
146. For just a few recent examples of the genre, see generally Stephen J.
Choi, Mitu Gulati & Eric Posner, The Dynamics of Contract Evolution, 88
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2013); Kevin E. Davis, Contracts as Technology, 88 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 83 (2013); Barak Richman, Contracts Meet Henry Ford, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV.
77 (2011); Omri Ben-Shahar & John A. E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default
Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 651 (2006); Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner,
Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or “The Economics of
Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV. 713 (1997).
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nature of the transaction; the identity, resources, and expertise of
the parties and their agents; the background legal regime—these
and other factors will shape the process of contract production. 147
Thus, explanations for the seeming rarity of customized
procedure are tentative and varied. 148 Three accounts are
especially prominent.
1. Negative Signaling
One possibility is that bargaining over adjudication
procedures sends a negative signal about the bargaining party’s
ability to perform or propensity for litigation. 149 In our
hypothetical technology sale, assume Seller’s past experience
with litigation has made it concerned about discovery costs. It
would prefer a contract that limits access to discovery and would
accept, if necessary, a somewhat lower price in exchange for the
restriction. But Buyer might misinterpret Seller’s request for a
discovery limitation as a sign that Seller doubts its ability to
perform. This risk may deter Seller from making the request. 150
The negative signaling account thus posits that parties avoid
bargaining over the rules of adjudication because they do not
147. For a recent summary of some of the relevant literature, see John F.
Coyle & Joseph M. Green, Contractual Innovation in Venture Capital, 66
HASTINGS L.J. 133, 138–44 (2014) (discussing the obstacles and conditions
conducive to innovation in contract formation).
148. See id. at 139 (identifying factors that hamper contractual innovation).
149. See Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 136, at 122 (“[B]usiness parties may
be reluctant to demand arbitration because the demand might be taken as
signaling a propensity to breach.”); cf. Rutledge & Drahozal, supra note 130, at
20 (noting that signaling may deter change to dispute resolution provisions);
Robert H. Gertner & Geoffrey P. Miller, Settlement Escrows, 24 J. LEGAL STUD.
87, 119 (1995) (“[B]ringing up dispute resolution procedures when negotiating a
contract may be a signal . . . of the likelihood that a claim will arise through
breach of contract.”).
150. See generally Kathryn E. Spier, Incomplete Contracts and Signaling, 23
RAND J. ECON. 432 (1992) (modeling how signaling concerns may deter parties
from proposing surplus-maximizing terms); Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic
Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 YALE L.J.
615 (1990) (explaining how signaling concerns may leave parties stuck with an
inefficient default); Scott Baker & Kimberly D. Krawiec, Incomplete Contracts in
a Complete Contract World, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 725, 754 (2006) (noting that
concerns over signaling may deter parties from contracting over required levels
of investment).
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want to signal they are likely to breach or to sue. What
hypotheses follow from this account? One possibility is that
contracts will not address dispute resolution at all—i.e., will
simply accept the default rules. But this need not be the case.
Transactional lawyers begin not with a blank sheet of paper but
with a form: the contract used in a prior deal. 151 They then
modify this template to suit the present transaction. 152 Standard
dispute resolution clauses, such as forum selection and
arbitration clauses, may be incorporated into contract boilerplate
and spread throughout the market even if parties do not
explicitly bargain over them. For example, a large firm with
market power can insist on a custom procedural clause without
worrying about sending a negative signal; it is in a position to
dictate terms. 153 Likewise, a prominent law firm might introduce
a change into the template it offers its many clients. 154 If adopted
151. See Choi et al., supra note 146, at 2–3 (describing the majority of
contracts as “modifications of existing templates”).
152. James C. Freund’s Anatomy of a Merger offers an amusing
(hypothetical) example in which a senior partner chastises a junior lawyer for
starting with the final contract from a prior transaction, thereby incorporating a
variety of concessions extracted by the other party after fierce bargaining. See
James. C. Freund, ANATOMY OF A MERGER: STRATEGIES AND TECHNIQUES FOR
NEGOTIATING CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 500–01 (1975).
153. This is one explanation for the apparently greater use of custom
procedural clauses in contracts of adhesion. Cf. Unbundling Procedure, supra
note 15, at 1991–92 (also noting that drafters can spread costs over many
contracts).
154. For analogous findings from the corporate and sovereign debt markets,
see Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in
Corporate Contracting (or “The Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV. 713,
753–60 (1997) (finding that underwriters played a role in disseminating new
corporate debt terms); Stephen J. Choi & Mitu Gulati, Innovation in Boilerplate
Contracts: An Empirical Examination of Sovereign Debt Contracts, 53 EMORY
L.J. 929, 971–76 (2004) (making a similar finding for high volume law firms).
Other actors can prompt changes to contract templates, including non-profits,
trade associations, and academics. See Kevin E. Davis, Contracts as Technology,
88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 83, 112–22 (2013) (discussing possible sources of contractual
innovation). In some contexts, moreover, small firms without a vested interest
in the status quo may also introduce changes, although these are not likely to
spread as widely. See generally W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Robert E. Scott, & Mitu
Gulati, Contracts, Origin Myths, and the Hunt for Pari Passu, 78 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 72 (2013); Anna Gelpern & Mitu Gulati, Innovation After the
Revolution: Foreign Sovereign Bond Changes Since 2003, 4 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 85
(2009); W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Disputing Boilerplate, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 50–
53 (2009); cf. Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & Robert Taylor, Set in Stone? Change
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by other parties, these templates may spread through the
market.
Thus, the most plausible prediction of the negative signaling
account is that dispute resolution clauses will exhibit low
variance, both across and within firms. There will be a relatively
small number of standard clauses in the market, but few
contracts will exhibit signs of individualized bargaining over
procedural rules. 155 In a given transaction, the choice among
these standard templates will be determined largely by the party
that provides the drafting template for the deal. 156 Individual
firms, moreover, will typically use the same clause, although
firms with substantial bargaining power may occasionally amend
their preferred template. 157
2. Contracts and the Product Innovation Cycle
A second possibility draws on literature likening contracts to
products, where innovation often occurs in punctuated bursts. 158
Change occurs incrementally until some technological advance or
exogenous shock disrupts the status quo. 159 To use an example
from the cement industry, from approximately 1910 to 1960, the
production capacity of cement kilns improved only
incrementally. 160 Then, in the 1960s, computers transformed the
and Innovation in Consumer Standard-Form Contracts, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 240,
244 (2013) (studying end user license agreements and finding greater
innovation by younger, growing, large firms, and firms with legal departments).
155. For the reasons discussed in the text, the relatively common use of
custom terms such as carve-outs, see Unbundling Procedure, supra note 15, at
1991, does not necessarily undercut negative signaling theory. Contract terms
can spread throughout a market, even without explicit bargaining.
156. See supra notes 151–154 and accompanying text (discussing the
significance of contract boilerplate).
157. See supra note 153 and accompanying text (noting that firms with
market power may dictate terms).
158. See, e.g., Tushman & Anderson, supra note 36, at 460 (discussing
patterns of technological change in a number of markets). For extensions of this
literature into the field of commercial contracts, see generally Choi et al., supra
note 146; Richman, supra note 146.
159. See Tushman & Anderson, supra note 36, at 440–44 (examining
patterns of technological change).
160. See id. at 452 fig.1a (showing production capacity).
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industry by allowing the construction of enormous, computercontrolled kilns with radically increased capacity. 161 To compete,
existing producers had to invest in the new technology. 162 Similar
patterns of innovation have been observed in mass-produced,
tradable contracts such as securities. Examining sovereign bonds,
for instance, Choi et al. demonstrate a broad shift in the contract
template in the wake of financial crises. 163 In prior work, I
document a similar shift after the United States and United
Kingdom enacted statutes that enhanced the ability of private
creditors to sue foreign governments. 164
Extending this literature, David Hoffman argues that
procedural tailoring will not become widespread until a shock
disrupts entrenched contracting practices. 165 He suggests that a
few relatively minor players, such as new market entrants, might
adopt atypical procedural clauses, but that these will not become
“a normal part of the transactional toolkit” until such a shock
occurs. 166 As an example of a sufficiently disruptive event, he
proposes that a high-profile court decision approving use of a rare
procedural clause might prompt widespread use of the clause. 167
161. See id. at 451–52 (explaining how technology transformed the
industry).
162. See id. at 450–52 (noting that leading firms benefited from the shift but
that large new investments were required); see also William J. Abernathy &
Kim B. Clark, Innovation: Mapping the Winds of Creative Destruction, 14 RES.
POL’Y 3, 12–13 (1985) (discussing the impact of the development of the closed
steel auto body).
163. See Choi et al., supra note 146, at 17, 20–27, 31–35 (documenting
changes in the sovereign bond template).
164. See generally W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Sovereign Immunity and
Sovereign Debt, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 67, 69 (2014) (exploring the impact on
sovereign bonds of changes in the law of foreign sovereign immunity).
165. See Hoffman, supra note 11, at 425–29 (analyzing the lifecycle of
contract innovation).
166. Id. at 427. The prediction that minor players will experiment first is
based on the insight that “marginal players believe that they can best compete
with established players by innovating, while established players have no
reason to risk negative outcomes from contractual innovation if they can rely on
returning customers or their reputation for satisfactory legal work.” Choi et al.,
supra note 146, at 8–9. See generally Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 154
(presenting evidence of innovation by minor players); Weidemaier, supra note
154 (same).
167. See Hoffman, supra note 11, at 428–29 (“What would such shocks look
like? A Supreme Court decision making terms salient—and explicitly approving
their enforceability—would be exemplary.”); see also Rutledge & Drahozal,
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Hoffman’s core prediction is that new procedural clauses will
not become widespread until after a highly salient, disruptive
event. 168 The most direct way to refute this hypothesis would be
to identify clauses that gained wide acceptance without such a
shift. None of the clauses coded for this Article meet that
description. 169 Nevertheless, there are other reasons—explored
more fully below—to question how closely this model captures the
process of innovation in commercial contracts. 170
3. Procedural Contracting Is Too Costly
Chris Drahozal and Erin O’Hara O’Connor offer an
alternative explanation. They suggest that parties can capture
many of the benefits of customized procedure by making an
initial choice of arbitration or litigation, selecting the jurisdiction
or arbitration provider that offers the most desirable bundle of
procedures. 171 By hypothesis, parties will choose the forum and
rules that offer the greatest net benefit across all future
disputes. 172 If the designated forum is not suitable for some
claims or remedies, parties can use carve-outs or carve-ins to
select a more appropriate set of bundled rules for this subset. 173
Recall that a carve-out allows parties who have chosen
supra note 130, at 955 (finding a modest increase in the use of class action
waivers in franchise agreements after the Supreme Court’s decision in AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011)).
168. See Hoffman, supra note 11, at 427–28 (arguing that change is
responsive to exogenous shocks, “not the slow accretion of precedent”).
169. See infra note 357 and accompanying text (leaving open the possibility
that a salient shock could prompt adoption of new procedural clauses).
170. See infra notes 174–182 and accompanying text (questioning the
contract-as-product model as applied to commercial contracts).
171. See Unbundling Procedure, supra note 15, at 1949–50 (noting that
studies show a “surprisingly little use of customized procedural rules in
contracts between sophisticated parties”).
172. See id. at 1954 (making this assumption); see also Hylton, supra note 7,
at 218 (emphasizing potential deterrence benefits of adjudication). These
benefits are offset by dispute resolution costs in the designated forum and, in
the case of arbitration, by the need to identify and draft an appropriate
arbitration clause. See Unbundling Procedure, supra note 15, at 1954–55
(discussing these costs).
173. See Unbundling Procedure, supra note 15, at 1955–61 (discussing
carve-outs and carve-ins).
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arbitration as the default method of dispute resolution to send a
subset of disputes to litigation; with a carve-in, parties who will
litigate most disputes send a subset to arbitration.
Drahozal and O’Hara O’Connor argue that, having made
such a choice, parties will often find it prohibitively costly to
engage in further customization. 174 To make this argument
concrete, assume that Seller and Buyer agree to the following
arbitration clause, which is based on a model promulgated by the
AAA:
Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this
contract, or the breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration
administered by the American Arbitration Association (AAA)
in accordance with its Commercial Arbitration Rules. Either
party also may, without waiving any remedy under this
agreement, seek a temporary restraining order and/or a
preliminary injunction from any court having jurisdiction, to
preserve the rights or property of that party pending the
institution of the arbitration process or the deliberation and
award of the arbitrator(s). 175

Arbitration has certain intrinsic characteristics that
distinguish it from litigation. 176 The list can be debated, 177 but the
174. See id. at 1963–65 (emphasizing the difficulty of identifying procedures
appropriate for all potential disputes). This is familiar terrain for the economic
analysis of contracts, which recognizes that contracts are necessarily
incomplete. See generally Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics, in
HANDBOOK OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 41, 46 (Claude Ménard & Mary M.
Shirley eds., 2005); Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After
Three Decades: Success or Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829, 846 (2003). One reason
for incompleteness is that some subjects are noncontractible, meaning “the
direct costs of drafting an effective state-contingent contract plus the cost of
error would be prohibitive.” Michael Klausner, The Contractarian Theory of
Corporate Law: A Generation Later, 31 J. CORP. L. 779, 785 (2006). Drahozal and
O’Hara O’Connor argue that this is true for many custom procedural rules.
175. AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, DRAFTING DISPUTE RESOLUTION CLAUSES: A
PRACTICAL GUIDE at 10 (2013). The first sentence of this clause is a modified
version of the AAA’s model arbitration clause for commercial disputes. See id.
(providing examples of arbitration clauses). The second sentence includes a
carve-out for claims seeking preliminary injunctive relief. Id.
176. On the choice between litigation and arbitration, see Hylton, supra note
7, at 213 (discussing the considerations that influence this choice); Bruce L.
Benson, To Arbitrate or To Litigate: That is the Question, 8 EUR. J. L. & ECON. 91
(1999) (discussing potential benefits of arbitration); Steven Shavell, Alternative
Dispute Resolution: An Economic Analysis, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2–9 (1995)
(same).
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primary distinction is that the arbitrator is the parties’ agent, not
a public servant, 178 and operates subject to market constraints. 179
Many parties also expect arbitration to involve less extensive
discovery. 180 By hypothesis, then, Seller and Buyer choose
arbitration over litigation because they expect this choice to yield
more accurate results and fewer opportunities for discovery
abuse. 181 They designate their preferred arbitration provider and
rule set from among a variety of market choices. 182 They also use
a carve-out to preserve the right to go to court when a party seeks
temporary or preliminary injunctive relief, which may be difficult
to obtain in arbitration. 183
177. For a more complete discussion of the advantages and limitation of
arbitration, see 1 IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW §§ 3.1–3.2.9
(1999).
178. See, e.g., George Watts & Son, Inc. v. Tiffany & Co., 248 F.3d 577, 580–
81 (7th Cir. 2001) (describing the arbitrator as the parties’ agent); Paul F.
Kirgis, The Contractarian Model of Arbitration and Its Implications for Judicial
Review of Arbitral Awards, 85 OR. L. REV. 1, 26–31 (2006) (discussing the
contractarian model of arbitration); see also Tom Ginsburg, The Arbitrator As
Agent: Why Deferential Review Is Not Always Pro-Arbitration, 77 U. CHI. L. REV.
1013, 1018–19 (2010) (noting limits on the ability of arbitrators to act as pure
agents for the parties).
179. See Ashenfelter, supra note 102, at 342–46 (discussing how market
forces influence arbitrators).
180. See Stipanowich & Lamare, supra note 7, at 24 (presenting survey data
on the reasons for embracing alternative dispute resolution methods).
Arbitration also offers somewhat greater privacy and confidentiality than
litigation in public courts. Again, this expectation is not absolute. On privacy
and confidentiality in arbitration, see generally Cole & Blankley, supra note 80,
at 318–19; Schmitz, supra note 80; Reuben, supra note 80. In exchange for these
benefits, parties to an arbitration agreement give up the procedural protections
of litigation, including judicial review. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2012) (providing
limited grounds for vacatur of an arbitration award); Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v.
Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 589–90 (2008) (determining that, under the Federal
Arbitration Act, parties cannot contract for de novo judicial review).
181. In Drahozal and O’Hara O’Connor’s terms, parties will choose to
arbitrate when the deterrence benefits of arbitration (net of dispute resolution
costs and specification costs—i.e., the cost of identifying and drafting an
appropriate arbitration clause) exceed the deterrence benefits of litigation (net
of litigation costs). Unbundling Procedure, supra note 15, at 1955.
182. The AAA provides administrative services (roughly akin to those
provided by the clerk of court) and not simply rules. See generally 3 IAN R.
MACNEIL, RICHARD E. SPEIDEL, & THOMAS J. STIPANOWICH, FEDERAL ARBITRATION
LAW § 26.2.3 (1994) (discussing administered arbitration).
183. See Drahozal & Ware, supra note 129, at 456–57 (noting that courts
have the ability to provide immediate injunctive relief while arbitration must
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Having allocated claims and remedies to the forum with the
most appropriate bundled rules, the parties may find that
additional tailoring is not worth the trouble. For example, a
clause requiring an arbitrator to have industry expertise will
increase dispute resolution costs across the board (experts charge
more) but will only sometimes increase accuracy. 184 Likewise, a
firm discovery limit might prove appropriate in some cases but
deny the adjudicator needed procedural flexibility in others. 185
The specification costs associated with identifying and drafting a
clause that offers net benefits across all foreseeable states might
exceed any potential benefits. 186 Drahozal and O’Hara O’Connor
remain somewhat agnostic, but their analysis suggests that,
except for carve-outs and (perhaps) carve-ins, specification costs
will be prohibitive for most procedural modifications. 187
Reviewing evidence from a variety of commercial contexts, they
show that parties who agree to arbitrate routinely use carveouts, 188 but they find no evidence supporting the routine use of
carve-ins. 189
C. The Limits of These Explanations
As suggested above, each of these explanations has limits.
The signaling explanation, for example, is hard to square with
wait until an arbitrator is appointed).
184. For example, if the parties disagreed about whether Seller designed the
product in accordance with industry standards, they might prefer an expert.
Otherwise, they might have to put on expensive evidentiary presentations to
educate the non-expert about industry practices and requirements. On the other
hand, many disputes would not require industry expertise, and in these
disputes, an expert adjudicator would only increase costs.
185. See Unbundling Procedure, supra note 15, at 1963–64 (noting that ex
ante specification may deny the arbitrator valuable flexibility to tailor
discovery).
186. See id. at 1964 (“[T]he cost of anticipating the universe of possible
disputes and ensuring that the customization provides a net benefit to the
parties could be quite significant.”).
187. See id. at 1989–92 (arguing that the lack of specialization in contracts
between sophisticated parties may be the result of prohibitive costs).
188. See id. at 1966–87 (analyzing contracts across industries).
189. Id. at 1949 n.18. By contrast, I find relatively frequent use of carve-ins.
See infra Table 4 (noting that 19%—35 of 184—of contracts that do not provide
for arbitration as the default nevertheless include a carve-in).
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the fact that parties frequently do contract over dispute
resolution procedures. 190 Although not widespread, arbitration
clauses, forum selection clauses, attorney fee-shifting clauses,
and even jury trial waivers appear with some frequency in
commercial contracts. 191 What is needed is a plausible
explanation for why parties who are already contracting over
such matters do not also address other aspects of the adjudication
process.
One possibility—consistent with the signaling account—
invokes the power of standard contract templates. 192 As I have
explained, it is possible for a contract term to enter widespread
use even though it is rarely the subject of negotiations. 193 A
clause introduced by a high-volume law firm—say, an arbitration
clause—might spread relatively unnoticed through the market. 194
Contracting parties might then hesitate to change or augment
this clause for fear of signaling an increased likelihood of a
dispute. 195 In other words, relatively invariant contracting
practices—such as widespread use of a relatively small number of
standard dispute resolution templates—would be consistent with
the signaling account. By contrast, if contracts address dispute
resolution in varied ways that suggest active negotiation, then we
may have to look elsewhere to explain the infrequent use of many
custom terms. Unfortunately, studies rarely examine contracting
practices in this manner, leaving the signaling account relatively
unexplored.
The contract-as-product model raises an additional, more
fundamental question. It is not clear how closely this model
corresponds to the way in which most commercial contracts are
produced. Contracts often share certain features of mass190. See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing negative signaling).
191. See supra Part III.A (discussing evidence of procedural customization).
192. See supra note 154 and accompanying text (discussing how firms with
substantial market power influence standard contract templates).
193. See supra notes 153–154 and accompanying text (discussing the
diffusion of standard terms).
194. See supra note 154 and accompanying text (discussing how law firms
can disseminate contract terms).
195. Cf. Gertner & Miller, supra note 149, at 119 (“[B]ringing up dispute
resolution procedures when negotiating a contract might be a signal, not of the
value of the ultimate claim, but of the likelihood that a claim will arise through
breach of contract.”).

1902

72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1865 (2015)

produced goods. 196 Like other producers, law firms and corporate
counsel engage in many similar transactions and develop
routines to ensure the predictable and efficient delivery of their
products (i.e., contracts). 197 This explains the prevalence of form
contracts and implies that lawyers do not introduce changes
without good reason. 198 But the pressure to leave well enough
alone—to use a standard clause despite its imperfections—is
stronger in some contexts than others. 199
The empirical foundation for the contract-as-product model is
based on studies of tradable financial contracts 200 or adhesive
form contracts. 201 Financial contracts are traded on secondary
markets, which encourages standardization and facilitates the
pricing of contract terms. 202 Adhesive forms are produced by one
196. See Richman, supra note 146, at 82 (noting that “basic organizational
economics suggests that when a law firm, like any firm, has to produce large
numbers of similar products, it constructs routines that are dedicated to the
mass production of homogeneous goods”); D. Gordon Smith & Brayden G. King,
Contracts as Organizations, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 31 (2009) (noting that the
routinization of contracts may make them resistant to change).
197. See Richman, supra note 146, at 79–83; cf. Clayton P. Gillette, Lock-In
Effects in Law and Norms, 78 B.U. L. REV. 813, 819 (1998) (noting that inertia of
contract terms can be reinforced by managerial biases against innovation).
198. The insistence that contracts are produced according to routine also
may explain why lawyers sometimes attribute changes in the contract template
to a mistake, even when the evidence clearly suggests the contrary. See W.
Mark C. Weidemaier & Mitu Gulati, How Markets Work: The Lawyer’s Version,
62 STUD. LAW, POL. & SOC’Y 107, 128 (2013) (discussing lawyer accounts of
contract production).
199. See infra notes 200–221 and accompanying text (noting that patterns of
innovation may differ across contract types).
200. See Choi, Gulati & Posner, supra note 146 at 59–60 (examining
sovereign bonds); Weidemaier, supra note 164, at 107–11 (same); see also Kahan
& Klausner, supra note 154, at 740–42 (noting—without invoking the product
innovation literature—the sudden and widespread adoption of event risk
covenants in corporate bonds shortly after the “watershed” buyout of RJR
Nabisco).
201. See, e.g., Marotta-Wurgler & Taylor, supra note 154, at 247–48
(studying end user license agreements).
202. See Henry T. Greely, Contracts as Commodities: The Influence of
Secondary Purchasers on the Form of Contracts, 42 VAND. L. REV. 133, 135–40
(1989) (discussing pressures towards standardization, including the impact of
secondary market purchasers); Michael Bradley, James D. Cox, & Mitu Gulati,
The Market Reaction to Legal Shocks and Their Antidotes: Lessons From the
Sovereign Debt Market, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. 289, 312–17 (2010) (examining impact
of market shock on sovereign bond prices and finding that some formulations of
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party, which need not negotiate and can spread drafting costs
across hundreds or thousands of transactions. 203 Commercial
contracts often lack these attributes, which means patterns of
innovation may differ. 204 It is reasonable to suppose that
pharmaceutical
industry
development
and
distribution
agreements, say, will be less standardized than corporate bonds.
This may be as true of their dispute resolution clauses as it is of
clauses that memorialize primary obligations.
Finally, it is surely true that some procedural modifications
entail high specification costs. 205 Nevertheless, if customized
procedure is indeed a rare phenomenon, this remains puzzling.
Despite competition in the market for arbitral (and judicial)
services, 206 parties have only limited options in the choice of
“bundled” procedure. Rules differ across courts and arbitration
institutions, but the differences are often minor, 207 and the
available rules do not address many areas of interest. Changes to
the default rules concerning attorney fees, statutes of limitation,
litigation or arbitration costs, pleading, discovery, or evidence—
none of these predictably result from a forum selection or
arbitration clause. 208 Parties who want to tailor these and many
other rules to their liking must do so directly in the contract.
a common contract clause were associated with a pricing penalty).
203. See Unbundling Procedure, supra note 15, at 1990–91 (noting that
customization may be more common in contracts of adhesion).
204. After a disruptive event, for example, secondary market trading may
enable market participants to quickly identify and price superior terms in
financial contracts. When thick secondary markets exist, contracts may
transition much more quickly into a new, dominant standard. But such markets
do not exist for most types of commercial contract.
205. See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing high specification costs in commercial
contracts).
206. See Wagner, supra note 65, at 1092–98 (exploring role of competition in
market for dispute resolution).
207. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi, The Problem with Arbitration Agreements,
36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1233, 1236–38 (2003) (discussing reasons why
“market forces work to keep arbitration choices limited”); Richard E. Speidel,
International Commercial Arbitration: Implementing the New York Convention,
in ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA at 189 (Cambridge University Press 2006)
(noting that, in the context of international commercial arbitration, provider
rules “do not vary dramatically in content from institution to institution”).
208. Arbitration offers some of these benefits in a rough and unpredictable
form. For example, arbitrators need not observe most evidentiary rules,
although they may choose to do so. See e.g., Commercial Arbitration Rules,
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Ex ante, it might border on the impossible to predict the net
impact of an agreement to take no more than two depositions.
But it is not clear why sophisticated commercial actors—by
hypothesis, able to compare the benefits and costs of arbitration
and litigation over all possible future disputes 209—could not make
a similar judgment about many other procedural modifications.
Return to the example of arbitrator expertise. An expert
arbitrator would lower dispute resolution costs and increase
accuracy in at least some potential disputes. 210 On the other
hand, experts cost more, and the parties will incur this extra cost
in every dispute, even those where expertise is of no value. 211 To
weigh the costs and benefits, parties must (in theory) anticipate
the universe of possible disputes, the probability of each, and the
impact of an expertise requirement in each case. 212 But this
daunting-sounding task may be easy in context. This is because,
in many commercial transactions, the contract value is so large
that even a minor increase in accuracy will provide deterrence
benefits that dwarf the expected costs of arbitrator expertise. 213
In some settings, moreover, the costs of procedural
customization are markedly lower. Consider the cost of
enforcement uncertainty. It is not certain that courts will enforce
supra note 91, at 22 (granting broad power to arbitrators in determining
relevant evidence). And although some arbitration rules now explicitly authorize
arbitrators to rule on dispositive motions, see id. at 22 (granting this authority),
arbitrators are reluctant to do so, which effectively renders pleading standards
irrelevant. Unless explicitly addressed in the contract, these matters will be left
to the arbitrator’s ex post discretion.
209. See Unbundling Procedure, supra note 15, at 1954 (making this
assumption).
210. See id. at 1963 (noting that an expert arbiter will eliminate the need to
“engage in costly proof exercises”).
211. Id.
212. See id. at 1962–63 (noting the potentially-significant costs of estimating
the value of arbitrator expertise).
213. This assumes, reasonably, that an arbitrator with industry expertise is
no less accurate for any category of dispute. As a simplified example, assume A
stands to gain $10 million if its contract with B is performed or enforced, $0
otherwise; that experts add value in ten percent of disputes; and that, in this
subset, an expert is ten percent more likely to detect and remedy B’s breach.
The value of an expertise requirement to A is $100,000 ($10 million x .1 x .1).
Unless expert arbitrators cost $100,000 more than non-experts, A should prefer
an expertise requirement. As A’s valuation of the contract increases, this
conclusion becomes increasingly certain regardless of other assumptions.
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some procedural clauses, including novel pleading standards 214
and strict discovery limits. 215 This uncertainty reduces the
expected value of these clauses. 216 Parties who are willing to
arbitrate, however, effectively reduce enforcement uncertainty to
zero. 217 For that reason, it is reasonable to suppose that we will
find more procedural customization when the contract also
includes an arbitration clause.
Because of these open questions, it is hard to evaluate the
prevailing explanations for the rarity of customized procedure.
The evidence, moreover, remains incomplete. To do more than
speculate, we need a holistic picture of how commercial contracts
address the subject of dispute resolution.
IV. A Closer Look at Commercial Contracts
A. The Dataset
This section analyzes a sample of material contracts that
were attached as exhibits to corporate SEC filings between

214. See Hoffman, supra note 11, at 398 (noting uncertainty of enforcement).
215. See Bone, supra note 8, at 1346 (noting doubts about enforceability of
discovery agreements).
216. Kapeliuk & Klement, see Contractualizing Procedure, supra note 1, at
18, give the example of a discovery limit that will save each party five in
litigation costs without predictably working to either party’s advantage. Ex
ante, the parties will agree to the clause. Enforcement uncertainty, however,
reduces the expected value. For example, if there is only a fifty percent chance
that the clause will be enforced, the expected savings to each is only 2.5.
Uncertainty also introduces unwarranted variance. This is because the amount
actually saved will be either zero or five (many commercial transactions do not
recur often enough to average out the risk), and the uncertainty may complicate
decisions about how much to invest in performance.
217. By and large, commercial parties may structure the arbitration process
however they please. Cf. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2012) (providing only limited grounds for
vacatur of an arbitration award). To qualify for this lenient treatment, a dispute
resolution process must be considered “arbitration,” but the definition of that
term imposes few procedural limits. Cf. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran,
536 U.S. 355, 382 (2002) (noting that the traditional definition of arbitration
requires only that the parties “choose a judge to render a final and binding
decision on the merits of the controversy and on the basis of proofs presented by
the parties”) (quoting 1 I. MACNEIL, R. SPEIDEL, & T. STIPANOWICH, FEDERAL
ARBITRATION LAW § 2.1.1 (1995)).
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January 1, 2000 and December 31, 2012. 218 By definition,
material contracts are not representative of all contracts. 219 But
the factors that make them unrepresentative—high stakes,
sophisticated parties—mean that the barriers to procedural
contracting are relatively low. 220 If parties do not adopt custom
procedural rules when the stakes are high, they are unlikely to do
so in other commercial settings. 221 Furthermore, because most of
the relevant studies also focus (at least in part) on material
contracts, the sample facilitates comparison with existing
research. 222
The sample was drawn from the EDGAR database on
Bloomberg Law. 223 It emphasizes commercial agreements,
including manufacturing and supply agreements, distribution
agreements, licensing and development agreements, and
marketing and other services agreements. 224 Excluding
218. Two research assistants performed the initial coding. Each received a
coding book and, after a training period, one-half of the contracts. I spot-checked
contracts that were coded as having no custom procedural clauses (other than a
choice of law clause). For contracts coded as having one or more custom
procedural clauses, I re-checked the coding in its entirety.
219. Material contracts include, among others, those “not made in the
ordinary course of business which is material to the registrant and is to be
performed in whole or in part at or after the filing of the registration statement
or report or was entered into not more than two years before such filing.” 17
C.F.R. § 229.601(b)(10)(i) (2014).
220. For example, parties to material contracts can more easily justify the
investments necessary to identify and provide for efficient dispute resolution
procedures. See The Flight to NY, supra note 132, at 1487 (noting that material
contracts “receive some degree of care and attention during the negotiation and
drafting phase”).
221. See Hoffman, supra note 11, at 406 (noting that large firms are more
likely to adopt efficient contract terms).
222. See supra note 129 (noting studies relying on samples of material
contracts).
223. I am indebted to Daniel Dalnekoff and Andrew Gilman at Bloomberg
for their assistance with the EDGAR database and for helpful discussions of
Bloomberg’s “DealMaker” database of material contracts.
224. As noted, other studies include a greater percentage of merger and
lending contracts. Among other differences, commercial contracts may be more
likely than merger and lending contracts to involve hard-to-specify performance
obligations. As an example, consider a development agreement in which parties
agree to “cooperate . . . in performing an investigation regarding the
manufacturing of clinical samples and later commercial supplies” of a product
that cannot be sold without regulatory approval, with the agreement to last
(subject to termination rights) until the product has been approved and the
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duplicates and a handful of contracts that were too heavily
redacted to be useful, the sample includes 402 contracts.
Approximately 60% (239) involve domestic transactions between
U.S. parties, 34% involve cross-border transactions, and another
6% involve transactions between non-U.S. parties located in the
same country. Table 2 provides more detail about the nature of
the contracts and the location of the parties. 225

parties have negotiated a separate manufacturing agreement. Process
Development Agreement dated Feb. 8, 2008 Between BioDelivery Scis. Int’l. and
LTS Lohmann Therapie-Systeme AG (on file with author). Parties to such
under-specified contracts may assign particular value to custom procedure.
Thus, the sample was designed to emphasize commercial transactions.
I identified contracts using the following query: “(supply n/2 agreement) OR
(develop! n/2 agreement) OR (distribut! n/2 agreement) OR (manufactur! n/2
agreement) OR (export! n/2 agreement) OR (import! n/2 agreement) OR (market!
n/2 agreement) OR (resell! n/2 agreement). This search typically identified
between 400 and 700 relevant contracts each year. Each contract had a 10%
chance of inclusion in the data set, with the caveat that, because of time and
resource constraints, we coded a maximum of forty contracts for a given year.
This limitation means that contracts attached to SEC filings made earlier in the
year had a greater chance of inclusion. (There is no reason to think filing date is
correlated with the use of custom procedural clauses.)
225. Occasionally, it was not possible to code all relevant variables, often
because information was redacted from the document filed with the SEC. Unless
the contract was too heavily redacted to yield useful information, I included it in
the dataset. Thus, although the dataset includes 402 total contracts, the
numbers reported in Table 1 and elsewhere do not always add up to this
amount.
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Table 2. Proportion of Contracts, by Transaction Type
and Party Location
(Number of Contracts in Parentheses)
Total Contracts in Dataset
402
Type of Transaction:
Development Agreement
14.7% (59)
Distribution Agreement
21.9% (88)
Manufacturing/Supply Agreement
55.7% (224)
Marketing/Other Services
7.7% (31)
Agreement
Location of the Parties:
U.S. Parties Only
59.9% (239)
Cross-Border, U.S. and Non-U.S.
29.1% (116)
Parties
Cross-Border, Non-U.S. Parties
5.0% (20)
Only
Non-U.S. Parties from the Same
6.0% (24)
Country

The sample overcomes some of the limitations present (to
varying degrees) in other studies. First, many studies focus on
only a small number of custom terms. Recall that the literature
posits that parties can benefit by adjusting burdens of proof,
pleading requirements, evidentiary rules, and many other details
of adjudication procedure. 226 Many of the relevant studies simply
do not code for these variables. 227 Those that do, such as
Hoffman’s study of material contracts filed with the SEC, have
sometimes relied on broad text searches of the relevant

226. See supra notes 6–9 and accompanying text (discussing types of
procedural customization).
227. This is not a criticism. Often researchers are interested in different
questions. Two of the relevant Eisenberg and Miller studies, for example,
explore forum selection, choice of law, and the role of state competition in
shaping these choices. See Ex Ante Choices, supra note 129, at 1988–99, 2001–11
(studying forum selection and choice of law); The Flight to NY, supra note 132,
at 154 (noting the possibility that competition for corporate charters may lead
“to adoption of state corporation law that maximizes the value of companies
incorporated in those states”). Given these questions, coding for procedural
tailoring would have made little sense. Likewise, O’Hara O’Connor et al., supra
note 129, code for a range of custom procedural terms, but the authors were
focused on customization in arbitration, and the sample included only CEO
employment contracts.
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database. 228 Searches like this are valuable and can support
inferences about the relative prevalence of particular terms, but
the results are necessarily impressionistic. 229 Finally, studies
often do not examine contracting practices over time and thus
cannot easily detect behavioral shifts. 230 Such shifts might be
caused by disruptive events such as major court decisions 231 or by
changes in party attitudes towards particular adjudication
“products.” For example, surveys of corporate counsel suggest
that “arbitration usage [is] contracting in most conflict settings,”
including commercial contract disputes. 232
B. A First Look: Dispute Resolution as a Point in Negotiations
If parties worry that bargaining over dispute resolution
procedures will signal negative information, 233 that concern is not
evident in the contracts. To the contrary, almost every contract
alters the default rules of adjudication in one or more ways, and
many establish detailed procedures to be followed both before and
after the filing of a formal claim. 234

228. See Hoffman, supra note 11, at 407–09 (using broad text searches in the
EDGAR database).
229. See id. at 406 (noting that text searches are impressionistic but can
provide information about the relative rates of contract terms).
230. Drahozal and Rutledge study franchise contracts over an extended
period of time but focus on arbitration clauses and waivers of the right to bring
a class action. See generally Rutledge & Drahozal, supra note 130.
231. See Hoffman, supra note 11, 426 (noting the potential impact of major
judicial decisions); Choi et al., supra note 146, at 1–3 (discussing the effect of
disruptive events on contracts).
232. See Stipanowich & Lamare, supra note 7, at 32, 45 chart G (reporting
survey results).
233. See supra Part II.B.1 (acknowledging and attempting to explain the
rarity of customized procedure).
234. See Unbundling Procedure, supra note 15, at 1952–61 (discussing the
many options parties have when considering dispute resolution procedure in
their contracts).
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1. Resolving Disputes Before the Filing of Formal Adversary
Proceedings
A significant minority of the contracts include detailed,
multi-tier dispute resolution procedures. In the event of a
dispute, these clauses first require informal, non-binding dispute
resolution processes, such as negotiation and mediation, and only
then allow formal proceedings in arbitration or litigation. 235 Some
of these clauses are perfunctory, but others are elaborate. As an
example, one contract establishes this multi-tier process:
•

After notice of a dispute, parties have ten days to begin
successive rounds of negotiation. If negotiators do not
reach agreement within fifteen days, responsibility for
negotiations passes to the next rung in the corporate
hierarchy.

•

If there is no resolution after 45 days, the parties must
attend mediation conducted by a mediator with
industry expertise.

•

If the parties still cannot resolve the dispute, either
may initiate litigation. 236

Most contracts are not so detailed, and multi-tier ADR
mechanisms like this are comparatively rare. As Table 3
indicates, the most common clause simply obliges the parties to
negotiate before initiating arbitration or litigation. Nevertheless,
over 40% of contracts in the dataset include some form of nonbinding ADR requirement.
235. On the (sometimes overstated) differences between mediation and
arbitration and the many variants of mediation, see Nancy A. Welsh and
Andrea Kupfer Schneider, The Thoughtful Integration of Mediation into
Bilateral Investment Treaty Arbitration, 18 HARV. NEG. L. REV. 71, 105–15
(2013).
236. Manufacturing, Sales & Marketing Agreement dated April 26, 2002
between Nomaco, Inc. and RBX Industries, Inc., ¶ 15(g). This contract,
admittedly one of the more elaborate examples, also specifies the location of the
mediation, explicitly obliges the parties to negotiate in good faith, allocates the
costs of mediation, identifies the preferred mediator by name, and creates
exceptions where parties may bypass the ADR process.
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Table 3. Proportion of Contracts Requiring
Non-Binding ADR
(Number of Contracts in Parentheses)
Negotiation Only 36.1% (145)
Mediation Only 3.0% (12)
Multi-Tier 5.2% (21)
No Requirement 55.7% (224)

Because negotiation and mediation requirements involve
non-binding dispute resolution, they tend to escape the notice of
scholars interested in the ability to modify judicial or arbitral
procedures. 237 In at least two respects, however, negotiation and
mediation requirements are relevant to debates over customized
procedure. First, widespread use of these clauses suggests that
dispute resolution is not a taboo subject during the contract
formation stage. 238 Second, parties potentially can use negotiation
and mediation to gather information, narrow the substantive
issues in dispute, or even agree to modify otherwise applicable
procedural rules. 239 To the extent this happens, negotiation and
mediation requirements serve as (incomplete) substitutes for ex
ante contracts over adjudication procedure.
2. Changing the Rules of Binding Adjudication
Turning our attention to binding adjudication, virtually
every contract alters at least one default rule, even if we do not
consider choice of law clauses (by far the most common custom
term, discussed in the next section). 240 More than three-quarters
(76.1%) of contracts include an arbitration or forum selection
clause incorporating the bundled rules of the designated court or
237. See, e.g., Contractualizing Procedure, supra note 1, at 14 (defining
procedural clauses to include only those that affect the way disputes will be
litigated or condition payments on litigation behavior).
238. See infra Part V.A (noting that signaling theories are hard to square
with frequent and varied use of clauses addressing dispute resolution).
239. Cf. Thomas J. Stipanowich, Contract and Conflict Management, 2001
WISC. L. REV. 831, 849 (2001) (noting possibility that mediation can facilitate
discussion of procedures for dispute resolution).
240. See infra Figure 1 (showing the cumulative proportion of contracts with
at least one procedural modification, exclusive of choice of law clauses).
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arbitral institution. 241 Note that the arbitration count includes
only contracts that select arbitration as the default method of
adjudicating most claims (subject to litigation carve-outs). 242 It
thus excludes contracts that send narrow questions, such as those
involving scientific or financial matters, for binding resolution by
private experts. 243 Although courts might treat these as
arbitration agreements, 244 I report them separately because they
are so narrow in scope; the parties must litigate most disputes.
These clauses are analogous to the carve-ins discussed by
Drahozal and O’Hara O’Connor, 245 and I will adopt that term. 246
Of the remaining contracts—those without arbitration or
forum selection clauses—most include at least one other
241. Infra Figure 1.
242. Infra Figure 1.
243. See Stipanowich, supra note 239, at 844–47 (discussing judicial
treatment of such clauses).
244. See id. (explaining how certain agreements may “bear some or all of the
earmarks of ‘binding arbitration’ and may even be identified by the agreement
as ‘arbitration’”). Compare Evanston Ins. Co. v. Cogswell Props., LLC, 683 F.3d
684, 693–94 (6th Cir. 2012) (appraisal process did not constitute arbitration),
and Salt Lake Tribune Pub. Co. v. Mgmt. Planning, Inc., 390 F.3d 684, 689–92
(10th Cir. 2004) (same) with Fit Tech, Inc. v. Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp.,
374 F.3d 1, 7–8 (1st Cir. 2004) (noting a clause providing for “final
determination” of certain valuation issues by accounting firm constituted
arbitration); cf. Ne. Fin. Corp. v. Ins. Corp. of N. Am., 757 F. Supp. 381, 383–84
(D. Del. 1991) (discussing Delaware law distinguishing arbitration from
appraisal).
The distinction can be important. Federal law entitles parties to what
amounts to an order of specific performance enforcing an arbitration agreement.
9 U.S.C. § 4 (2012); see Necchi S.P.A. v. Necchi Sewing Mach. Sales Corp., 348
F.2d 693, 696 (2d Cir. 1965) (“An order under the Federal Arbitration Act
compelling a party to arbitrate is simply an order granting specific performance
of an arbitration provision . . . .”). That remedy may or may not be available in
cases where the clause does not qualify as arbitration under federal (or state)
law. See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7601 (MCKINNEY 2012) (authorizing specific
performance of agreements “that a question of valuation, appraisal or other
issue or controversy be determined by a person named or to be selected”).
245. See Drazhozal & O’Connor, supra note 10, at 1950 (exploring use of
carve-outs to unbundle forum procedural rules).
246. Assuming courts defer to the third party’s decision, these clauses
modify the rules of litigation by shifting primary fact-finding responsibility to a
private party. See, e.g., State Room, Inc. v. MA-60 State Assocs., LLC, 995
N.E.2d 807, 811–13 (Mass. Ct. App. 2013) (distinguishing appraisal from
arbitration and explaining limited judicial review of appraisal conducted
pursuant to commercial lease).
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procedural modification. 247 The list includes clauses that waive
the right to jury trial, entitle the prevailing party to attorney
fees, shorten the statute of limitations, expand or restrict
depositions or document discovery, provide a method for serving
process, allocate burdens of proof, waive hearsay objections, 248 or
send limited questions to third-party neutrals (i.e., carve-ins). 249
Taking these modifications into account, almost 90% of contracts
modify the background rules of litigation in some way. 250 If we
add clauses that expand or limit remedies for breach, only 6.5% of
contracts contain no modification at all, except for any choice of
law clause. 251

Figure 1. Cumulative Proportion of Contracts
with at Least One Procedural Modification
Proportion without any
modification (choice of law
excluded): 6.5% of total

Arbitration or forum
selection clause:
76.1% of total

Including clauses
expanding or restricting
remedies: 93.8% of total

Including any of the
following: loser -pays attorney
fees, expanded/restricted
discovery, burden of proof,
shortened claims period,
service of process,
independent expert/lab:
86.5% of total
Including jury waivers:
76.9% of total

247. See infra Figure 1 (reporting the proportion of contracts with at least
one procedural modification).
248. A contract was counted as waiving hearsay objections if it included a
blanket waiver of all objections. A few contracts may have included narrow
waivers of best evidence and hearsay objections to the admissibility of copies
instead of originals. See Hoffman, supra note 11, at 417 (finding only a few such
contracts in a broad text-based search of EDGAR).
249. Infra Figure 1.
250. Infra Figure 1.
251. Infra Figure 1.
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C. A More Detailed View: Off-the-Rack and Custom Rules
Figure 1 shows that most contracts include an arbitration or
forum selection clause, and many include additional (or
alternative) custom terms. This Section provides details,
beginning with the choice of bundled arbitration or court
procedures. Unless otherwise noted, only contracts that involve at
least one U.S. party are included in the results. 252
1. Choice of Law and Forum: The Preference for New York
Prior research has found a marked preference for New York
law and New York courts, although the research samples
consisted entirely or predominately of corporate and lending
transactions. 253 That preference is also apparent in the present
sample of manufacturing, licensing, and other commercial
contracts. 254 Almost every contract in the dataset (95.7%)
includes a choice of law clause, thereby incorporating off-the-rack
rules to govern the parties’ primary obligations. 255 In domestic
transactions, contracts most often designate New York law,
followed by California and Delaware. 256 Cross-border contracts
252. Contracts between non-United States parties are of course less likely to
select the law of a United States state. See Cuniberti, supra note 131, at 14–17
(studying international contracts—only a subset of which involved any United
States party—and finding a preference for English and Swiss law over the law
of a state of the United States).
253. See, e.g., The Flight to NY, supra note 133, 1488 (using mostly financial
contracts and contracts related to mergers or asset sales, but including several
other agreement types); Ex Ante Choices, supra note 129 (using merger
agreements). For evidence of how lawyers describe the selection of governing
law, see Kostritsky, supra note 88.
254. The dataset includes 355 contracts involving at least one United States
party, 340 of which have a choice of law clause. Three of these were excluded
because the choice of law clause was redacted.
255. This is consistent with the results of other studies. See supra note 131.
256. Although Eisenberg and Miller report more frequent use of New York
law, their dataset includes a greater proportion of financial and corporate
transactions for which New York law may have greater appeal. See The Flight to
NY, supra note 133, at 1492 (noting that licensing, employment, and settlement
agreements do not “fall[] within the core areas for which New York and
Delaware have campaigned”). For the subset of licensing agreements, they
report 20.4% of contracts choose New York law, 16.3% choose California law,
and 10.2% choose Delaware law. Id. at 1491 tbl.3. These figures correspond
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exhibit the same pattern, except that a greater proportion selects
the law of a foreign jurisdiction. 257

Figure 2. Governing Law, by Transaction Type
New York
California
Delaware
Texas
Massachusetts
Illinois
New Jersey
Minnesota

9.8%
7.0%
3.6%
4.8%
6.3%
2.6%
3.6%
3.1%
0.9%
4.0%
0.9%

Other US
Non-US law

12.8%

17.9%
16.3%
17.0%

0.4%

21.1%

Domestic
Cross-border

27.8%

16.1%
24.1%

Although only around one in five contracts calls for the
application of New York law, the appeal of that state’s law
becomes more apparent when we recognize that most
transactions are negotiated or performed in a state where at least
one party has its principal place of business. 258 For that reason,
there is likely to be a strong association between the law selected
in the contract and the location of the parties. 259 There may also
be a lesser association between choice of law and place of
incorporation, although that seems unlikely in commercial
transactions (as opposed to, say, merger agreements). 260
One way to test the appeal of a state’s law is to examine how
frequently contracts designate that law when neither party is

closely to those reported in the main text. Infra Figure 2.
257. See infra Figure 2 (reporting choice of law clauses).
258. See The Flight to NY, supra note 133, at 1479 (“A party’s business
location often relates to where events under a contract occur.”).
259. See The Flight to NY, supra note 133, at 1479 (noting a link between
place of business and events relevant to the contract).
260. See id. at 1495–96 tbl.6 (reporting an association between place of
incorporation and choice of law).
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incorporated or principally located in the state. 261 Figure 3 shows
New York’s dominance on this measure in domestic
transactions. 262 When the chosen law does not correspond to
party location or place of incorporation, the choice is almost
always New York. 263 Parties to cross-border transactions showed
a similar preference for New York law, although many also
designated the law of a foreign country. 264

Figure 3. Choice of Law When No Party Is
Principally Located or Incorporated in the
Designated State
New York
California
Delaware
Texas
Massachusetts
Illinois
New Jersey
Minnesota
Other US
Non-US law

73.0%
2.7%
2.7%
0.0%
2.7%
5.4%
5.4%
0.0%
2.7%
5.4%

261. See id. at 1499–1500 (reporting that, in their sample of contracts, New
York had “the highest rate of contracts specifying its law that lack a measurable
contact with the state”).
262. The dataset includes 325 contracts for which it was possible to code the
choice-of-law variable as well as information related to the principal place of
business and place of incorporation of the parties. For similar findings in the
domestic context, see The Flight to NY, supra note 133, at 1499 tbl.9 (finding
that contracts without a core contact with New York—defined as a match
between the chosen law and (i) either party’s principal place of business or state
of incorporation or (ii) the attorney’s locale—frequently designated that state’s
as the governing law).
263. See infra Figure 3 (showing that, when no party is principally located
or incorporated in the designated state, New York is designated 73% of the
time).
264. In domestic transactions, 20.1% involved a mismatch between the
designated law and the parties’ principal places of business and states of
incorporation. Such mismatches occurred more frequently (32.4%) in crossborder transactions. Here, too, New York law dominated, although not quite to
the same degree. Of this subset of cross-border contracts, 55.9% chose New York
law and 20.6% chose the law of a foreign country with no apparent connection to
either party.
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The preference for New York law also manifests in forum
selection decisions. 265 Nearly forty percent (39.7%) of the
contracts include a forum selection clause. 266 Parties generally
prefer to litigate in the state whose law governs the
transaction, 267 so not surprisingly, New York is the most
frequently designated forum. 268 Given the preferred status of
New York law, this also means that, when a contract calls for
litigation in a jurisdiction with no obvious connection to the
parties, that jurisdiction is almost always New York. 269

265. See infra Figure 4 (showing how in forum selection clauses New York is
often the preferred forum in either domestic or cross-border contracts).
266. Some contracts include both arbitration and forum selection clauses.
The count in the text includes only those where a judicial forum is designated to
enforce at least some of the parties’ primary obligations. It includes contracts
that allow for litigation on the merits or let parties to go to court for preliminary
injunctive relief, but excludes contracts that only designate a forum for
enforcing the arbitration agreement or award.
267. In the sample studied here, 93.3% of contracts that designated both a
governing law and a litigation forum designated the same state for both. See
also The Flight to NY, supra note 133, at 1503 (“When a forum is specified, it
overwhelmingly corresponds with a contract’s choice of law.”).
268. See infra Figure 4 (reporting choice of forum by transaction type).
269. Twenty-eight contracts involve such a mismatch; twenty-one of these
provide for litigation in New York. I do not mean to express a firm view on the
direction of causation. For example, it is possible that parties generally prefer
New York courts, and select New York law because that is the law those courts
are accustomed to applying.
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Figure 4. Forum Choice by Transaction Type
22.9%
25.0%

New York
15.2%
15.0%

California
9.5%
10.0%

Delaware
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0.0%

8.6%
5.7%
5.0%

Massachusetts
Other US
Non-US

Domestic
Cross-Border

37.1%

15.0%
1.0%

30.0%

Courts generally enforce forum selection clauses but
sometimes interpret them as permissive rather than
mandatory. 270 A clause open to this interpretation lets parties sue
and be sued in the designated court (assuming subject matter
jurisdiction) but leaves open the possibility of litigation
elsewhere. 271 Parties who want to litigate only in the designated
forum must state this expressly. 272 About three-quarters of the
contracts with forum selection clauses (73.2%) do so. 273

270. 7 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 15.15 (4th ed.).
271. See id. (explaining how forum selection clauses may be interpreted as
permissive when the parties’ intent to litigate in a particular forum is not clear).
272. See id. (explaining how an exclusive forum selection clause will be
enforced so long as the parties “clearly express their intent to limit litigation to
that particular forum”).
273. I treated a forum selection clause as exclusive only if it used “exclusive”
or similar words (e.g., “only”, “waives all other jurisdictions,” etc.) to describe the
designated forum. Courts sometimes interpret less direct language (such as
“jurisdiction and venue shall be . . . .”) as providing for exclusive jurisdiction, but
parties who use such language cannot be certain of its effect. See ASM
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Allen, 656 F. Supp. 838, 839–40 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (interpreting
the quoted phrase to designate an exclusive forum).
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2. Arbitration and the Dominance of the AAA and ICC
Nearly half of the contracts (48.2%) include an arbitration
clause. 274 As noted, this excludes contracts that call for binding,
third-party resolution only of narrow technical or scientific
questions. 275 As expected, arbitration clauses appear more
frequently (61.0%) in contracts involving cross-border
transactions, 276 where arbitration has enforcement and other
advantages over litigation in national courts. 277
Although surveys of corporate counsel suggest a decrease in
the use of arbitration since the late 1990s, 278 no such decrease is
apparent in this sample. Given the limited size of the dataset,
there is expected, year-to-year variance in the proportion of
contracts with arbitration clauses. This includes a seemingly
sharp drop for contracts with an initial term beginning in 2012,
although this is likely due to the small number of contracts (ten)
for that year. 279 (For this reason, Figure 5 depicts 2012 contracts
separately.) Despite the variance, there is no indication that
arbitration has fallen seriously out of favor. In domestic
transactions, the proportion of contracts with arbitration clauses

274. Infra Table 4.
275. See supra note 242 and accompanying text (distinguishing such carveins from contracts providing for arbitration as the default method of dispute
resolution).
276. For comparative results, see, e.g., Unbundling Procedure, supra note 15,
at 23–24 tbl.5 (excluding contracts between two non-US parties from the same
country, reporting arbitration clauses in 35.7% of domestic contracts and 42.9%
of contracts between companies from different countries); The Flight from
Arbitration, supra note 129, at 353 tbl.4 (finding only 20% overall incidence of
arbitration in contracts involving a non-United States party, but significant
variance by contract type—e.g., 63.4% of licensing agreements); Drahozal &
Ware, supra note 129, at 465–66 tbl.4 (reporting arbitration usage of 47.6% and
71%, respectively, in domestic and international joint venture agreements).
277. See Peter B. Rutledge, Convergence and Divergence in International
Dispute Resolution, 2012 J. DISP. RESOL. 49, 52–58 (2012) (discussing these
advantages and the possibility that they may be eroded by developments in
international civil litigation).
278. See Stipanowich & Lamare, supra note 7, at 8–10 (reporting survey
results describing a trend towards non-binding forms of alternative dispute
resolution).
279. Contracts were collected from SEC filings through December 31, 2012.
Material contracts pre-date a company’s SEC filings, often by a number of years.
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declines after a peak in 2003 but remains higher, in each
subsequent year, than in 2001—the low point in the sample.

100%

Figure 5. Proportion of Domestic and X- Border
contracts with arbitration clauses, 2000 -2012
Maximum, x - border
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More than ninety percent (92.3%) of contracts that provide
for arbitration specify the provider whose rules will govern the
process. 280 In domestic transactions, the AAA dominates; over
80% of contracts call for arbitration under its rules. 281 In crossborder transactions, the ICC and AAA share the dominant role. 282

280. This is consistent with studies of other contract types. See O’Hara
O’Connor et al., supra note 129, at 162 (reporting that 93% of contracts with
arbitration clauses in a sample of CEO employment contracts chose an
arbitration association). Many contracts, however, designate the rules
imperfectly or incompletely. For example, some contracts provide for arbitration
under “AAA rules,” or language to that effect, without identifying which of the
AAA’s many rules the parties want to apply.
281. The AAA also appears to dominate the domestic arbitration market in
joint venture and executive employment contracts. See Christopher R. Drahozal
& Peter B. Rutledge, Contract and Procedure, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 1103, 1126–27
(2011) (finding the AAA was the designated provider in 85.7% of a 2007 sample
of franchise agreements and 88.9% of a 2008 sample of domestic joint venture
agreements); O’Hara O’Connor et al., supra note 129 at 162–64 (finding that
90% of a sample of CEO employment contracts specified AAA arbitration).
282. See infra Figure 6 (reporting choice of arbitration provider in domestic
and cross-border contracts).
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Figure 6. Choice of Arbitration Provider
in Domestic and Cross
-border Contracts
80.0%
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CPR
OTHER

29.5%
2.1%
41.0%

Domestic
Cross-border

5.3%
3.3%
8.4%
6.6%
4.2%
19.7%

3. Customizing Off-the-Rack Rules
The discussion thus far has shown that most commercial
contracts use forum selection and arbitration clauses to allocate
disputes to a preferred forum, and also that some forums
dominate these markets. As noted, parties also can draft custom
procedural clauses to supplement or replace the bundled rules of
their chosen forum. 283 Most contracts, however, contain relatively
few custom clauses. 284
Table 4 divides the dataset into contracts with arbitration
clauses, contracts with forum selection (but not arbitration)
clauses, and contracts that do not explicitly incorporate bundled
procedural rules. Within these categories, it reports the frequency
of twelve modifications to rules of procedure and evidence.
Excluding choice of law clauses, the maximum number of
modifications in any contract is five; the median number is
zero. 285 This means that most contracts do not include any of
these twelve custom clauses. 286 For the sake of comparison—and
283. See supra Part II.B (discussing the option to select and supplement
bundled forum procedural rules).
284. See infra Table 4 (showing relatively few custom clauses aside from
arbitration and forum selection clauses).
285. Infra Table 4.
286. Some modifications are relevant to only one category, so care should be

1922

72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1865 (2015)

to demonstrate that parties routinely do alter non-procedural
rules—Table 4 also reports the frequency of five modifications to
the rules governing remedies. The fact that most contracts alter
the background law of remedies highlights the puzzle: Why are
procedural modifications so rare?
Table 4. Procedural Tailoring in Arbitration, When Parties Select a
Forum, and When Parties Do Neither
All
Arbitration
Forum
No
Contracts
Clause
Selection
Designated
Clause, No Procedural
Arbitration
Bundle
Total Contracts
355
171
99
85
Additional
Procedural Clauses
Jury Waiver
8.2% (29)
6.4% (11)
15.2% (15)
3.5% (3)
Carve-in
Carve-out from
Arbitration
Forum Selection
(for Carved-out
Claims or
Arbitration
Enforcement)
Loser Pays
Attorney Fees
Shortens Statute of
Limitations
Expands Deposition
Rights
Limits Deposition
Rights
Expands Document
Discovery
Waives Hearsay
Objections
Provides for Service
of Process

n/a

n/a

23.2% (23)

14.1% (12)

n/a

48.5% (83)

n/a

n/a

n/a

24.6% (42)

n/a

n/a

23.9% (85)

25.7% (44)

26.3% (26)

17.6% (15)

2.8% (10)

2.3% (4)

2.0% (2)

4.7% (4)

2.8% (10)

5.3% (9)

1.0% (1)

0%

2.2% (8)

4.7% (8)

0%

0%

2.8% (10)

4.7% (8)

2.0% (2)

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

5.9% (21)

5.3% (9)

12.1% (12)

0%

taken in making comparisons. For example, carve-outs by definition exist only
when the contract includes an arbitration agreement. There is also a separate
forum selection category relevant only to contracts with arbitration agreements.
These forum selection clauses designate the forum for carved out claims,
litigation to enforce the arbitration agreement or award, or both.
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Table 4. Procedural Tailoring in Arbitration, When Parties Select a
Forum, and When Parties Do Neither
Addresses Burden of
1.1% (4)
1.2% (2)
1.0% (1)
1.2% (1)
Proof
Additional Clauses
Per Contract 287
Mean
0.71
0.82
0.83
0.41
Median
Standard
Deviation
Range
Remedies
Imposes Any
Remedy
Limitation
Forbids Punitive
Damages
No Consequential
Damages
Forbids Multiple
Damages
Sets Damages
Maximum
Liquidated Damages

0.0

0.0

1.0

0.0

0.93

1.07

0.89

0.56

0–5

0–5

0–3

0–2

71.5% (254)

74.9% (128)

73.7% (73)

62.4% (53)

40.8% (145)

44.4% (76)

42.4% (42)

31.8% (27)

69.9% (248)

71.9% (123)

72.7% (72)

62.4% (53)

2.2% (8)

4.1% (7)

1.0% (1)

0%

19.2% (68)

18.7% (32)

21.2% (21)

17.6% (15)

6.5% (23)

4.1% (7)

10.1% (10)

7.1% (6)

Given these findings, it is fair to say that procedural
contracting consists primarily of the parties’ choice of their preferred
set of off-the-rack rules in arbitration or litigation.288 Parties are not
indifferent to dispute resolution or unwilling to inject the prospect of
breach into negotiations. So much is clear from the prevalence of

287. The totals are for additional procedural modifications and thus exclude
any initial choice of arbitration or forum. Choice of law clauses are also
excluded.
288. For simplicity, the table combines all contracts involving at least one
U.S. party, whether or not the contract involves a cross-border transaction.
Parties to cross-border transactions arguably require more procedural autonomy
than parties to purely domestic transactions. See Strong, supra note 79, at 13
(suggesting that “the desire for procedural autonomy may be heightened in
international matters”). But this is not reflected in the contracts. In every
category, parties to cross-border transactions engaged in less tailoring than
parties to domestic transactions. Across all domestic transactions, the mean
number of additional modifications was 0.76. In cross-border transactions, the
mean was 0.62.
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arbitration, forum selection, and remedy-modifying clauses. 289
Likewise, carve-outs, carve-ins, and attorney fee-shifting clauses
each appear in a substantial minority of contracts. 290 But few
contracts show evidence of detailed procedural customization. In
particular, few contracts address the routine details of
adjudication procedure, such as the rules of evidence and
discovery. 291
In relative terms, however, some clauses are fairly common.
These include carve-outs from arbitration (48.5% of arbitration
agreements), loser-pays attorney fee clauses (23.9% of all
contracts), 292 carve-ins sending discrete issues to third-party
experts (19% of contracts without an arbitration clause), and jury
trial waivers (8.2%). 293 Moreover, the fact that arbitration
agreements more often address the details of discovery is
consistent with the hypothesis that arbitration agreements may
289. See supra Table 4 (identifying arbitration, forum selection, and
remedial modification clauses as the most frequently used in contracts that
choose procedure).
290. Supra Table 4.
291. Nor did any contracts explicitly adopt a different pleading standard,
such as the pre-Twombly standard. See Kapeliuk & Klement, Contracting
Around Twombly, supra note 121, at 11, 15–22 (suggesting that parties might
adopt a less demanding pleading standard).
292. This proportion requires the loser pay the winner’s attorney fees. A
greater proportion (38.5%) allows but does not require fee-shifting. Such clauses
also change the default rule, which does not typically grant this discretion to the
adjudicator. Some observers suggest that arbitrators have discretion to award
fees in the absence of express authorization. O’Hara O’Connor et al., supra note
129, at 166. This may be technically correct; some courts, for example, interpret
AAA arbitration rules this way. See 2 DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
§ 48.1 (2014). But it seems unlikely that arbitrators will routinely depart from
background legal rules without express authorization. Arbitrators typically act
as if parties want them to apply background legal rules, even when not
technically required. See W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Judging Lite: How
Arbitrators Use and Create Precedent, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1092, 1124–35 (2012)
(demonstrating that arbitrators rarely cite other arbitration awards and that
arbitration awards and judicial opinions exhibit relatively similar citation
practices).
293. Some contracts with arbitration clauses also waive the right to jury
trial. These waivers are relevant in several scenarios. First, but for the waiver, a
party might demand a jury trial in litigation over the enforceability of the
arbitration clause. See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2012) (providing for a jury trial when
demanded by the party opposing a petition to compel arbitration). Second, but
for the waiver, a party might demand a jury trial in cases where the arbitration
clause is unenforceable or inapplicable. Id.
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involve somewhat greater procedural tailoring. 294 When we turn
to procedural modifications unique to arbitration, the support for
that hypothesis grows much stronger.
4. A Closer Look at Arbitration
Some procedural modifications can appear only in contracts
with arbitration agreements. Table 5 reports the frequency of use
of sixteen such clauses, 295 which can be grouped according to
function:
Scope of arbitration: If parties disagree about the scope of
their agreement to arbitrate, arbitration law supplies
presumptions to resolve the disagreement. 296 These are default
rules that the parties can expressly override by contract.
Carve-outs (also reported in Table 4) narrow the presumptive
scope of arbitration by allowing or requiring litigation of a
subset of disputes. 297 So-called “arbitrability clauses” 298
expand the presumptive scope of arbitration by letting the
arbitrator resolve disputes over the enforceability and scope of
the arbitration clause itself. 299
294. Contracts with arbitration clauses were significantly more likely to
include one of the three custom, discovery-related clauses (χ2(1, N=355)=14.9,
p < .001). These include clauses that expand or limit deposition rights and
clauses that expand document discovery rights. Express limits on document
discovery were not explicitly coded, but few, if any, contracts included one.
295. Because a few contracts had the relevant portions redacted, the number
of contracts ranges from 164 to 171, depending on the clause.
296. For example, “doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should
be resolved in favor of arbitration.” Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 (1983).
297. See supra notes 90–93 and accompanying text (describing carve-ins and
carve-outs).
298. See, e.g., Societe Generale de Surveillance, S.A. v. Raytheon European
Mgmt. Sys. Co., 643 F.2d 863, 869 (1st Cir. 1981) (noting that ICC arbitration
rules permit the arbitrator to resolve questions of the arbitrator’s “jurisdiction”).
299. See generally Alan S. Rau, Everything You Really Need to Know About
“Separability” in Seventeen Simple Propositions, 14 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 1 (2003).
Only contracts that explicitly assigned such questions to the arbitrator were
coded as having an arbitrability clause. Many contracts implicitly assign them
to arbitrators by incorporating provider rules with that effect. Some courts,
however, require more express language. Compare Shaw Grp. Inc. v. Triplefine
Int’l Corp., 322 F.3d 115, 124–25 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that incorporation of
ICC rules evidenced intent to arbitrate questions of arbitrability), with
Burlington Res. Oil & Gas Co. v. San Juan Basin Royalty Tr., 249 S.W.3d 34,
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Arbitration costs: Arbitration involves substantial costs not
present in litigation, including administrative fees, facility
rental charges, and arbitrator compensation. 300 These can
substantially reduce the prevailing party’s net recovery.
Coding captured whether the parties addressed arbitration
costs at all and whether they adopted a loser-pays rule.
Arbitrator qualifications: Arbitration “folklore” has it that
arbitrators have special expertise that ensures efficient,
accurate results. 301 In terms of professional background and
experience, however, a legally trained arbitrator will probably
look much like a state or federal judge assigned to preside over
commercial disputes. 302 Thus, if parties want an arbitrator
with particular expertise or training, they must contract for it
directly. Otherwise, the administering institution (if the
contract designates one) will decide these matters. Coding
captured whether the parties (i) imposed any expertise
requirement, (ii) required industry expertise, or (iii) required
legal training.
Number of arbitrators: Changing the number of arbitrators
can alter decision-making dynamics. 303 For example, an
arbitrator on a three-member panel must not only reach a
41–42 (Tex. App. 2007) (reaching the opposite conclusion with respect to AAA
rules).
300. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration Costs and Contingent Fee
Contracts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 729, 736–42 (2006) (discussing arbitration costs and
the AAA fee structure).
301. See Edward Brunet, Replacing Folklore Arbitration with a Contract
Model of Arbitration, 74 TUL. L. REV. 39, 40–43 (1999) (noting this widespread
but potentially inaccurate view of arbitration).
302. For example, AAA arbitrators need at least ten years of senior-level
professional or legal experience, among other qualifications, but the eligibility
criteria do not mention industry or transactional expertise (or even legal
training). See Commercial Arbitration Rules, supra note 91, at 15 (noting that,
unless the parties agree otherwise, arbitrators are appointed from the AAA
national roster); see also Qualification Criteria for Admittance to the AAA
National Roster of Arbitrators, AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N 1–2 (listing the
qualification criteria for admittance to the national roster of arbitrators). I do
not know of data on the average age or professional experience of AAA
arbitrators. As of 2008, the mean age of federal judges at the time of first
commission was just over fifty, and the mean number of years between the start
of a career and the commission was approximately twenty-four. See Monique
Renée Pournet, Kyle C. Kopko, Dana Wittmer & Lawrence Baum, Evolution of
Judicial Careers in the Federal Courts, 1789-2008, 93 JUDICATURE 62, 66–67
(2009) (reporting the appointment age of federal judges over time).
303. See Kapeliuk, supra note 104, at 270 (discussing dynamics on multiarbitrator panels).
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decision but attempt to persuade fellow panelists, and this
may require compromise. 304 Institutional rules may give an
administering institution discretion as to the number of
arbitrators. 305 Thus, if parties have a preference, they may
need to express it in the contract. Coding captured whether
the parties adopted any clause addressing arbitrator number
and whether they adopted a clause requiring three arbitrators.
Regulating merits discretion: Arbitrators have broad
discretion to decide issues within the scope of the arbitration
clause. 306 If the result is one that the parties could have
adopted by settlement, a court will probably uphold it, even if
the court could not have ordered similar relief. 307 Parties who
want to limit this discretion must do so expressly in the
contract. 308 Contracts were coded for three methods of limiting
discretion: (i) prohibiting relief that a court could not award, 309
(ii) establishing an appellate arbitration process, 310 and
(iii) final offer arbitration, which forces the arbitrator to choose
between resolutions proposed by the parties. 311

304. See id. at 292–97 (studying panel dynamics in investment arbitration).
305. See American Arbitration Association Commercial Arbitration Rule R16 and Procedures for Large, Complex Commercial Disputes Rule L-2 (providing
for one arbitrator in cases involving less than $1 million and three arbitrators in
cases over $1 million, but giving AAA discretion to vary the number);
International Chamber of Commerce, Rules of Arbitration, Article 12(1–(2)
(defining a default of one, but International Court of Arbitration of the ICC may
appoint three).
306. See, e.g., Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp., 885 P.2d 994,
1007 (Cal. 1994) (holding that, unless expressly limited by the contract,
arbitrators may “fashion relief they consider just and fair under the
circumstances . . . so long as the remedy may be rationally derived from the
contract and the breach”).
307. See George Watts & Son, Inc. v. Tiffany & Co., 248 F.3d 577, 580 (7th
Cir. 2001) (ruling that an arbitrator manifestly disregards the law only by
directing the parties to violate the law or by awarding relief forbidden by the
contract).
308. See supra note 306 and accompanying text (noting that parties must
expressly limit arbitrator discretion).
309. See, e.g., O’Flaherty v. Belgum, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 286, 328 (Cal. Ct. App.
2004) (vacating award where contract forbade arbitrator to award relief “not
available in a court of law”).
310. For example, the AAA offers separate appellate rules that parties may
incorporate by reference. American Arbitration Association, Optional Appellate
Arbitration Rules (2013).
311. See supra note 105 and accompanying text (describing final offer
arbitration).
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Procedural details before and during the hearing: Finally,
contracts were coded for clauses addressing procedural
matters that might arise before or during the hearing,
including clauses that (i) specify the hearing location,
(ii) authorize the arbitrator to rule on dispositive motions, 312
(iii) expand discovery rights by incorporating the relevant
provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or related
state rules, 313 and (iv) allow the arbitrator to issue
subpoenas. 314

312. See Alfred G. Ferris & W. Lee Biddle, The Use of Dispositive Motions in
Arbitration, 62 DISP. RESOL. J. 17, 18 (2007) (discussing arbitrator authority to
consider such motions; note that AAA Commercial Arbitration rule R-33 now
explicitly authorizes dispositive motions).
313. See, e.g., PECO II, Inc., Supply Agreement § 18.5.4 (Form 8-K) (Oct. 2,
2008) (“[E]ach party shall be entitled to conduct discovery in accordance with
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . . .”). These clauses expand discovery
rights because the rules applicable in federal court usually permit more than
arbitration rules. For example, AAA rules do not explicitly authorize depositions
in many commercial disputes, while the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow
ten by default. Compare Commercial Arbitration Rules, supra note 91, at 19
(providing, in R-22, for pre-hearing exchange of information but not explicitly
authorizing depositions), with FED. R. CIV. P. 30(a)(2)(A)(i) (requiring leave of
court to take more than ten depositions).
314. The contract cannot bestow subpoena power on the arbitrator, but the
applicable law may authorize the arbitrator to subpoena a witness for trial or
for discovery purposes. See, e.g., 9A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE CIVIL § 2455.1 (3d ed. 2014) (reviewing power
to issue discovery subpoenas under federal law); UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT
§ 17(d) (2000), 7 U.L.A. (2009) (authorizing subpoenas, including for discovery
purposes). Contract terms authorizing subpoenas make clear that the parties
have agreed to the arbitrator’s exercise of this authority.
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Table 5. Proportion of Arbitration Agreements with
Additional Custom Terms
Scope of Arbitration:
Carve-out
48.5% (83/171)
Arbitrability Clause
7.6% (13/170)
Arbitration Costs:
Contract Allocates Costs
52.4% (89/170)
Loser Pays Costs
18.3% (31/169)
Arbitrator Number and Qualifications:
Addresses Number of Arbitrators
72.8% (123/169)
Requires Three Arbitrators
38.4% (63/164)
Imposes Any Expertise
25.3% (43/170)
Requirement
Requires Industry Expertise
18.8% (32/170)
Requires Legal Training/Experience 10.0% (17/170)
Regulating Arbitrator Discretion
Only Relief Available in Court
1.2% (2/170)
Final Offer Arbitration
4.7% (8/170)
Appellate Arbitration Process
0.6% (1/170)
Hearing Location and Procedure
Specifies Hearing Location
85.7% (144/168)
Authorizes Dispositive Motions
1.8% (3/170)
Incorporates Rules of Civil
7.6% (13/170)
Procedure
Allows Subpoenas
0.6% (1/170)

Table 5 shows that parties who agree to arbitrate routinely
customize at least some aspects of the process. Taking these
arbitration-specific clauses into account, parties who agree to
arbitrate adopt, on average, significantly more additional
customized procedures (3.4) than parties who designate a judicial
forum as the default setting for resolving disputes (0.83). 315
Clauses that specify the hearing location, allocate arbitration
costs, and specify the number of arbitrators appear in over half of
the contracts. 316 Carve-outs appear in nearly half. 317 A
315. Supra Table 5. The arbitration mean collapses some coding categories
to avoid double counting, including the coding for clauses addressing arbitration
costs, arbitrator expertise, and the number of arbitrators. As an example, any
contract that addresses arbitration costs was counted as having one additional
custom term, whether or not the contract adopts a loser-pays rule. Nevertheless,
contracts with arbitration clauses had, on average, significantly more additional
custom procedural clauses (M=3.4, SD=1.9) than contracts with forum selection
clauses ((M=0.8, SD=0.9); t(263)=34.5, p<.001).
316. Supra Table 5.
317. Supra Table 5.
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substantial minority of contracts impose arbitrator expertise
requirements or require the loser to pay arbitration costs. 318 Once
again, however, relatively few contracts address routine
procedural matters such as discovery, pleading, or evidence. 319
Notably, of the clauses addressing such matters, the most
common simply elects an alternative bundle of discovery rules:
those applicable in court. 320
V. Implications
Normatively, the contracting practices described in Part III
seem relatively unobjectionable. One potential objection to
customized procedure is that parties might adopt rules that
undermine the legitimacy of courts. 321 For example, if parties
dispense with the need for judicial impartiality, this might erode
public perceptions of the judiciary and, over time, the quality of
judicial decisions. 322 Another objection is that parties might adopt
procedures that impair the interests of non-parties.323 For example,
they might adopt a clause that forbids third parties to intervene in
their lawsuit. 324 A third is that unfamiliar, party-designed

318. Supra Table 5. Cost-shifting clauses are almost as common as loserpays attorney fee clauses, which appear in 23.9% of all contracts and 25.7% of
contracts with arbitration clauses. Supra Table 5.
319. Supra Tables 4, 5. Combining Tables 4 and 5, none of the following
appeared in more than 5.3% of contracts: clauses that (i) shorten the statute of
limitations, (ii) authorize more depositions than the relevant default, (iii) limit
the ability to take depositions, (iv) authorize more document discovery than the
relevant default, (v) waive hearsay objections, (vi) specify a method of serving
process, (vii) expressly allocate the burden of proof, (viii) authorize an arbitrator
to consider dispositive motions, or (ix) authorize an arbitrator to issue
subpoenas (background law permitting).
320. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or analogous state rules,
7.6% of arbitration agreements authorize discovery.
321. See Bone, supra note 8, at 1388 (suggesting that procedural
modifications should not be enforced if they undermine the capacity of judges to
engage in principled reasoning).
322. Robert Bone uses this example, although he does not suggest that such
clauses are common. Id. at 1393 n.261.
323. Id. at 1373.
324. This is Michael Moffitt’s example, supra note 10, at 511, although he
also does not suggest such clauses are common.
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procedures might increase the expense of judicial proceedings, to
the detriment of taxpayers. 325
These objections, of course, presume that parties actually
modify judicial procedures. Yet, aside from forum selection and
choice of law clauses, this rarely happens. 326 When parties do
change the rules, moreover, it is primarily to require the loser to
pay attorney fees. 327 This may impact the parties’ own incentives,
but it hardly alters the judicial function or implicates third-party
interests. 328
Parties more frequently customize the rules in arbitration. 329
This raises few normative objections in commercial contracts, 330
but it does complicate existing accounts of customized procedure
by suggesting that the phenomenon is not as uncommon as many
suppose. The findings here are generally consistent with those
reported by O’Hara O’Connor et al. in their study of executive
employment agreements, although they did not discuss some
clauses (such as arbitrator expertise requirements) that appeared
with some frequency in the present sample. 331 On the whole, the
findings also match those reported by Drahozal and O’Hara
O’Connor and support their hypothesis that procedural
customization consists primarily of allocating claims and
remedies to an appropriate forum. 332 But while few parties
drafted extensive sets of custom rules, a handful of other
325. See Moffitt, supra note 10, at 514 (questioning whether disputes over
custom procedural clauses might burden courts).
326. See supra Table 4 (documenting the rare use of custom procedural
clauses).
327. See supra Table 4 (calculating that 23.9% of contracts require the loser
to pay the winner’s attorney fees).
328. See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Does the English
Rule Discourage Low-Probability-of-Prevailing Plaintiffs?, 27 J. LEGAL STUD.
141, 531 (1998) (exploring the incentive effects of fee-shifting).
329. See supra Table 5 (reporting use of custom procedure in contracts with
arbitration clauses).
330. See Bone, supra note 8, at 1385–87 (exploring why party choice is more
problematic in litigation than in arbitration).
331. See O’Hara O’Connor et al., supra note 129, at 162–69 (reviewing
arbitration clauses in CEO employment contracts).
332. See Unbundling Procedure, supra note 15, at 1991–92 (arguing that
procedural customization consists mainly of the selection of bundled rules). So
does the relatively common appearance of carve-ins—another mechanism for
allocating claims and remedies to a preferred forum (in this case, arbitration).
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procedural clauses made relatively frequent appearances. 333 The
question is what these findings imply for the debate over
customized procedure. 334
A. On Negative Signals and Product Cycles
The negative signaling account cannot easily accommodate
the contracting practices described in Part III. This is not to say
that negotiating parties never forego procedural modifications
that might raise suspicions about their litigiousness or ability to
perform. 335 But the fact that nearly every contract alters the
default rules of litigation in some way implies that such concerns
are relatively muted. 336 Moreover, recall that the most plausible
hypothesis generated by the negative signaling account is that
contracting practices will be relatively invariant when it comes to
dispute resolution. 337 There might be a few contract templates,
but we should not see contracts vary in ways that suggest active
negotiation.
The sheer variety of approaches to dispute resolution,
however, suggests that parties do not unreflectively adopt
whatever dispute resolution clause appears in the initial drafting
333. See generally supra Tables 4, 5.
334. Given time and resource constraints, it was not possible to code for
every conceivable form of procedural tailoring. For example, Table 4 may
undercount clauses that shift the burden of proof because coding did not
encompass some mechanisms by which parties can accomplish this, such as
expansive termination rights. See Scott & Triantis, supra note 2, at 873–78
(discussing impact of termination rights). Table 4 also may understate the
prevalence of loser-pays attorney fee clauses. This is because some contracts
include indemnity clauses that require one party to pay the indemnitee’s
attorney fees, and these are not included in the fee-shifting count. This makes
sense in most cases, as the indemnity covers only litigation brought by third
parties and therefore does not shift fees in a dispute between the parties
themselves. But some contracts also require “indemnification” for a party’s
breach of contract.
335. See supra notes 149–150 and accompanying text (discussing how
signaling concerns might deter bargaining over procedure).
336. See supra Figures 1, 4 (demonstrating that, although contracts do not
extensively tailor procedural rules, nearly all contracts alter the background
rules of litigation).
337. See supra notes 151–157 and accompanying text (discussing how
custom procedural clauses might spread even if parties were generally reluctant
to bargain over procedural rules).
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template. Consider just two pieces of evidence. First, the data set
includes multiple contracts for a number of companies, and these
almost always include different dispute resolution provisions. 338
Second, arbitration clauses varied wildly in their structure and
content; literally no two clauses were identical. 339 The implication
is that dispute resolution clauses are not mere boilerplate,
migrating from contract to contract. Perhaps parties occasionally
hesitate to negotiate procedural rules. But it is hard to imagine
how so many templates could exist if signaling concerns were a
serious deterrent to negotiation.
There is also reason to question the contract-as-product
account, which posits that novel procedural innovations will not
take hold until an exogenous shock disrupts current drafting
templates. 340 One reason a shock might be necessary is that
parties and their lawyers may doubt the enforceability of a new
procedural clause. 341 If the clause is not obviously superior to
alternatives—for instance, because a court may not enforce it 342—
there is little reason to adopt it. 343 But if this were the
338. Compare, e.g., Supply Agreement dated Jan. 1, 2000, between Simcala,
Inc. and UCAR Carbon Company, Inc. (bare-bones arbitration clause) (on file
with the author), with Amended and Restated Supply Agreement dated Jan. 1,
2001, between Simcala, Inc. and Dow Corning Corp. (mechanism for negotiation
and a different arbitration clause) (on file with the author); compare
Manufacturing and Supply Agreement dated March 12, 2003, between
SkinMedica, Inc. and Smith & Nephew Wound Management (La Jolla)
(requiring negotiation before arbitration) (on file with the author), with
Manufacturing and Supply Agreement dated June 30, 2002, between Enhanced
Derm Technologies, Inc. and SkinMedica, Inc. (no negotiation requirement;
different arbitration clause) (on file with the author).
339. For example, contracts devoted an average of 311 words to the
arbitration clause, but this figure ranged from a bare-bones arbitration clause of
only nineteen words to a multi-page clause totaling 1,671 words.
340. See supra notes 158–170 and accompanying text (discussing the
contract-as-product account).
341. Cf. Marotta-Wurgler & Taylor, supra note 154, at 272–74 (finding
terms in end user license agreements became more common as judicial
enforcement became more certain).
342. Recall that enforcement uncertainty both reduces the expected value of
a clause and introduces variance that the parties would (by hypothesis) prefer to
avoid. See supra note 216 and accompanying text (addressing the cost of
enforcement uncertainty).
343. David Hoffman doubts that enforcement uncertainty retards
experimentation in this context, and he may be right. See Hoffman, supra note
11, at 427 (suggesting that a significant shock, rather than doubts about legal
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explanation, it is odd that we do not find more custom procedural
clauses in arbitration, where enforcement is assured. 344 True,
parties who agreed to arbitrate were more likely to include a
custom term addressing discovery, and this suggests that
enforcement uncertainty may deter some parties from adopting
novel clauses. 345 Many procedural clauses, however, were
extremely rare even in contracts that provided for arbitration. 346
Still, the contract-as-product account may be apt even if
enforcement uncertainty does not suppress innovation. 347 In
many respects, it is curious that patterns of commercial contract
innovation sometimes follow those observed in product markets.
In the latter, transformative innovations can be obvious. Recall
how computers transformed the cement industry by allowing the
construction of vast, computer-controlled kilns. 348 The value of a
huge jump in production capacity is apparent. 349 Producers that
could invest in the new technology gained a dramatic competitive
advantage; those that could not risked getting left behind. 350
enforceability, motivates changes to contracts). But enforcement uncertainty is
at least one reason a shock might be necessary. Technological discontinuities
prompt product innovation because the new technology offers “sharp priceperformance improvements over existing technologies.” Tushman & Anderson,
supra note 158, at 441. If contracts follow this product innovation cycle, then a
new clause will be adopted only if at least one party (or its lawyers) perceives it
as an improvement over the old. This is unlikely if the clause cannot be
enforced. For this reason, enforceability may be necessary to widespread
adoption. Hoffman is surely right, however, that enforceability does not assure
adoption, even for surplus-maximizing clauses. See infra notes 354–356 and
accompanying text (discussing inertia in contracting practices and the relevance
of external shocks).
344. See supra 217 and accompanying text (noting that modifications to
arbitration procedures will almost always be enforced).
345. See supra note 294 and accompanying text (noting greater prevalence of
discovery modifications in contracts with arbitration clauses).
346. See supra Table 4 (reporting prevalence of custom procedure in
litigation and arbitration).
347. See Hoffman, supra note 11, at 427 (expressing doubt that enforcement
uncertainty deters the adoption of new terms).
348. See supra notes 158–162 and accompanying text (describing
technological discontinuities in the cement industry).
349. See Tushman & Anderson, supra note 158, at 443 (documenting
significant gains in efficiency resulting from computer-controlled kilns).
350. See supra notes 158–162 and accompanying text (noting the effects of
the introduction of computers on the cement industry in the 1960s).
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It is much harder to assign value to a clause in a commercial
contract, especially when there is no secondary market to supply
pricing information about contracts with and without the clause.
Because drafters often have little solid evidence of the likely
impact of a new clause, contract production is as much a social
practice as an economic one. 351 Transactional lawyers create or
amend clauses because they believe the change adds value, 352
because they want to appear creative to clients and other
lawyers, or simply because this is what transactional lawyers are
supposed to do. 353 Likewise, lawyers sometimes fail to make even
beneficial changes to contracts. 354 When this happens, there is
evidence that external shocks, including salient legal
developments, can provide impetus for change. 355 If nothing else,
the perception that the development requires a response may
result in new contract language. 356
If a new clause became commonplace without a precipitating
shock, this would present a more serious challenge to the
contract-as-product account. But that did not happen for any of
the clauses described in Part III. Thus, it remains possible that a

351. See Weidemaier & Gulati, supra note 198, at 127–30 (discussing how
lawyers explain patterns of innovation in contracts).
352. See, e.g., Coyle & Green, supra note 147, at 180–81 (recounting lawyer
explanations for innovation in venture finance).
353. For a classic, if somewhat plaintive, description of the classic model of
transactional lawyering, see Weidemaier et al., supra note 154, at 97–98
(recounting a junior lawyer’s story—likely apocryphal—of watching a senior
lawyer draft sovereign bond clauses from scratch, with a fountain pen).
354. See MITU GULATI & ROBERT E. SCOTT, THE THREE AND A HALF MINUTE
TRANSACTION: BOILERPLATE AND THE LIMITS OF CONTRACT DESIGN (2013)
(exploring why lawyers failed to modify sovereign bonds in the wake of a major,
unexpected court decision); Weidemaier et al., supra note 154, at 98
(hypothesizing that lawyers might fail to make changes to contracts in an effort
“not to be seen as making changes to documents that are supposed to be
standardized”).
355. For example, statutory developments with respect to sovereign
immunity prompted lawyers to revise sovereign bond contracts, even though the
statutes largely codified existing law. See Weidemaier, supra note 164, at 74
(discussing the impact of changes in sovereign immunity law on sovereign
bonds).
356. Cf. Hoffman, supra note 11, at 427 (“[C]hange will be largely responsive
to highly-salient shocks, not the slow accretion of precedent.”).
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high profile judicial opinion or other salient event would cause
the widespread adoption of new procedural clauses. 357
B. Coarse, Not Granular, Procedural Tailoring
On the whole, the findings discussed in Part III are
consistent with the account offered by Drahozal and O’Hara
O’Connor, which stresses that many procedural clauses entail
high specification costs. 358 Yet, their account does not fully
capture the diversity of customized adjudication, which includes
more than simply an election of bundled litigation or arbitration
rules, supplemented as necessary by a carve-out. 359 Recall that
some clauses, by definition, cannot appear in both litigation and
arbitration. 360 Parties cannot adopt a carve-in, for example,
without first choosing litigation as the default option. 361 If we
consider only the relevant contracts—such as the subset in which
it is possible to find each procedural clause—ten different clauses
appear in roughly 20% or more of contracts. 362

357. See Hoffman, supra note 11, at 428 (suggesting that high profile court
decisions may constitute “sufficient, highly salient, exogenous shocks” that help
new clauses to become widespread).
358. See supra Part III.B.3 (discussing this account of procedural
customization).
359. Cf. Unbundling Procedure, supra note 15, at 1991 (positing that
customization primarily takes the form of a choice of bundled rules
supplemented, in arbitration, by litigation carve-outs).
360. See supra notes 296–314 and accompanying text (discussing custom
clauses specific to arbitration).
361. See infra Table 6 (showing that 19% of contracts contain a carve-in
provision).
362. I am omitting arbitration, forum selection, and choice of law clauses.
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Table 6
Clause
Arbitration Location
Arbitrator Number (Any Clause)
Arbitration Costs (Any Clause)
Carve-out (from Arbitration)
Arbitrator Number (Panel of Three)
Arbitrator Expertise (Any Requirement)
Attorney Fees (loser pays)
Carve-in (to arbitration)
Arbitrator Expertise (Industry
Knowledge)
Arbitration Costs (Loser Pays)

Prevalence
85.7%
72.8%
52.4%
48.5%
38.4%
25.3%
23.9% 363
19.0%
18.8%
18.3%

The relatively common use of these clauses shows that
commercial actors do more than allocate claims and remedies to
their preferred forum and its bundled rules. But the list also
reveals that customized adjudication occurs within a limited
domain. With the (irrelevant) exception of clauses that specify the
place of arbitration, 364 each clause falls into one of the first three
functional categories described in Table 1. 365 The three categories
encompass clauses that (1) designate a different bundle of
procedural rules for a subset of disputes (carve-outs and carve-ins),
(2) regulate arbitrator characteristics and incentives (number and
expertise requirements), or (3) allocate adjudication costs and
payouts (attorney fee-shifting and arbitration cost allocation). 366
The fourth category consists of clauses that alter timing
rules, address service of process, specify pleading or discovery
363 An even greater proportion (38.5%) authorizes, but does not require,
fee-shifting. See supra note 292 and accompanying text (discussing need to
explicitly authorize fee-shifting, even in arbitration).
364 In a sense, this is not an exception at all because a clause specifying the
place of arbitration can also incorporate bundled rules. For example, in
international arbitration, the law of the situs typically governs the arbitration
proceeding and any action to set aside the award. See Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards art. V(1)(e), June 10,
1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (allowing an award to be set aside “by a competent
authority of the country in which, or under the law of which,” it was made).
365 Supra Table 1.
366 The relatively frequent use of clauses that allocate arbitration costs is
consistent with the findings of O’Hara O’Connor et al. in CEO employment
contracts. O’Hara O’Connor et al., supra note 129.
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rules, or dictate the rules of evidence or proof. 367 Without
exception, clauses in this category are extremely rare. 368 The
most common, which instructs an arbitrator to replace the
designated arbitration institution’s discovery rules with those
found in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, appears in only
7.6% of relevant contracts. 369 That this is the most common
clause in the fourth category only highlights the apparent
reluctance of parties to specify the particulars of the adjudication
process. After all, the clause simply replaces one set of bundled
rules (arbitral discovery) with another that is equally, if not
more, familiar (the federal discovery rules). This is, in effect, a
modular approach to building procedure in which parties
assemble a procedural regime from discrete portions of available
off-the-rack rules. 370
What parties almost never do is write contracts that dictate
procedure at the granular level of pre-trial and trial practice. 371
Instead, they allocate disputes to one or more forums and then
make relatively “coarse” modifications to the forum’s bundled
rules. I use the term as a shorthand way to describe clauses that
alter adjudicator incentives or expertise or party incentives to
invest in (or abuse) the process of adjudication. As an example,
return to our hypothetical sales contract. Anticipating
disagreements over product quality, Seller may worry that Buyer
will file frivolous claims, hoping to use the threat of expensive
discovery to extract concessions. 372 Even if the claim has merit,
Seller may fear that Buyer will abuse the discovery process. 373
367 See supra Table 1 (describing types of procedural customization).
368 See supra Table 4 (reporting prevalence of custom procedure).
369 Supra Table 5.
370 Cf. Henry E. Smith, Modularity in Contracts: Boilerplate and
Information Flow, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1175, 1188 (2006) (discussing boilerplate as
modular contract component).
371 Except for clauses that specify a method for serving process (5.9%), not
a single clause in the fourth category appears in more than 2.8% of contracts.
Some, such as clauses that adopt alternate pleading standards, do not appear at
all. Supra Table 4.
372 See, e.g., Bruce L. Hay, Civil Discovery: Its Effects and Optimal Scope,
23 J. LEGAL STUD. 481, 500–01 (1994) (discussing how plaintiffs may use
discovery strategically to impose costs on the defendant).
373 By discovery abuse, I refer to the use of discovery to impose unjustified
costs on an adversary, such as costs that are not likely to increase the accuracy
of the adjudicator’s decision.
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To mitigate these risks, the parties might agree to a clause
imposing a loser-pays rule for attorney fees. 374 Fee-shifting
clauses have complex implications. 375 However, the parties might
reasonably expect a loser-pays rule to discourage the filing of
frivolous and low-probability claims, 376 reduce incentives to abuse
discovery, 377 increase litigation expenditures (and perhaps
accuracy), 378 and more fully compensate the injured party. 379 The
374 Although background law sometimes authorizes fees to prevailing
parties, this is rare. Thus, parties who want to impose a fee-shifting rule must
do so expressly in the contract. See supra note 292 and accompanying text
(discussing need to expressly provide for fee-shifting).
375 For different perspectives on the impact of fee-allocation rules on
settlement behavior (assuming a lawsuit has been filed), compare Polinsky &
Rubinfeld, supra note 328, at 143 (modeling the decision between going to trial and
settling and demonstrating that, under a loser-pays rule, more low-probability
plaintiffs go to trial), and Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology
of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 113, 161 (1996) (“[B]y raising the stakes at trial,
the loser pays system makes litigation itself more valuable and can discourage
settlement.”), with Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Predicting the Effects of Attorney Fee
Shifting, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 139, 159 (1984) (expressing uncertainty
but suggesting that a loser-pays rule applied “against individual litigants
relying on their own resources might well result in a greater tendency to settle
claims”); see also Rhee, supra note 9, at 535 (explaining that a loser-pays rule
produces more variable outcomes and, on the assumption that most litigants are
risk-averse, may “work at the margin to systematically push cases towards
settlement”).
376 See Rhee, supra note 9, at 555–56 (assessing the potential for fee-shifting
to deter frivolous suits); Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, The Relational
Contingency of Rights, 98 VA. L. REV. 1313, 1364 (2012) (discussing the potential for
fee-shifting to deter strategic lawsuits).
377 See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Background Paper: American Law Institute
Study on Paths to a “Better Way”: Litigation, Alternatives, and Accommodation,
1989 DUKE L.J. 824, 891 (1989) (noting that fee-shifting for discovery abuse
“reduce[s] one side’s ability to weaken the other’s settlement position (based on
the merits) by forcing the adversary to incur substantial unreimbursable
litigation costs”); see also David Rosenberg & Steven Shavell, A Model in Which
Suits Are Brought for Their Nuisance Value, 5 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 3, 10 (1985)
(noting that without fee-shifting, parties in position to impose litigation costs on
the other, as through discovery, may be able to extract favorable settlements).
378 See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The English Versus the
American Rule of Attorney Fees: An Empirical Study of Public Company
Contracts, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 327, 335–37 (2013) (noting that under a
fee-shifting regime, parties might spend more on litigation and the possibility
that this would increase accuracy).
379 See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, Welfare Implications of Costly Litigation
Under Strict Liability, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 18, 28–30 (2002) (exploring
deterrence benefits of shifting the plaintiff’s cost of litigation); Thomas D. Rowe,
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prospect of fee-shifting also may give Seller some assurance that
Buyer will not abuse the discovery process. 380 But the clause does
not dictate what claims the parties may file or how they may
employ pre-trial or trial procedures. 381
Or consider an arbitrator expertise requirement. Compared
to a non-expert, an expert arbitrator can more easily evaluate the
Seller’s performance. 382 This changes the parties’ incentives in
deciding what claims to bring and how much to invest in proving
claims once they have been asserted. 383 For example, parties who
expect to arbitrate before an expert may be deterred from
bringing frivolous claims but more willing to challenge
performance defects that might escape the notice of a non-expert. 384
Again, however, the expertise requirement does not dictate any
aspect of pre-trial or trial practice.
The prevalence of modifications like these suggests that
procedural contracting is less costly than is sometimes

Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical Overview, 1982 DUKE
L.J. 651, 657 (1982) (noting argument that, without fee shifting, injured parties
may be denied full compensation). A fee-shifting regime may also encourage
litigants to invest more heavily in proving claims once filed, and the parties may
(or may not) value this effect ex ante. See Clinton F. Beckner III & Avery Katz,
The Incentive Effects of Litigation Fee Shifting when Legal Standards Are
Uncertain, 15 INT’L. REV. L. & ECON. 205, 206 (1995) (suggesting that fee shifting
“encourages litigants to spend more in cases that they do bring”).
380 See Rosenberg & Shavell, supra note 377, at 10 (noting potential for
fee-shifting to deter parties from using discovery rules to impose costs on an
adversary).
381. Clauses allocating arbitration costs perform a similar function. Loser-pays
clauses appear in 18.3% of arbitration agreements, and a much greater proportion of
contracts expressly give the arbitrator discretion to shift costs. Institutional
arbitration rules may allow this as well. See, e.g., Commercial Arbitration Rules,
supra note 91, at 28 (providing, in R-47, that the scope of an award may include the
assessment of fees, expenses, and compensation).
382. See supra note 184 and accompanying text (discussing accuracy
benefits of arbitrator expertise, at least in some cases).
383. For example, parties may need to educate a non-expert arbitrator about
the commercial setting; they may decide to dispense with such proof if the
arbitrator knows the industry.
384. This is one reason parties may choose arbitration over litigation, and it
applies equally to the choice of expert versus non-expert arbitrators. See Steven
Shavell, Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Economic Analysis, 24 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1, 2 (1995) (noting that expert arbitrators might more accurately detect
substandard performance).
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assumed. 385 Parties do not seem to find it prohibitively difficult to
decide their preferred number of arbitrators or whether to
require an arbitrator with industry expertise. 386 Likewise, they
have no obvious difficulty contracting over attorney fees or cost
allocation rules. 387 Indeed, most contracts go further, directly
addressing the payouts available in any dispute. 388 As Table 4
shows, contracts routinely include waivers of consequential
(69.9%) and punitive (40.8%) damages, and a surprisingly large
percentage (19.2%) explicitly caps recoverable damages. 389 If
parties can decide ex ante that a consequential damages waiver
offers net benefits across all future disputes, it should not
surprise us that they can make similar judgments about how to
allocate the lawyer fees and adjudication costs.
The customized adjudication literature must develop an
account of why clauses like these occur so frequently, while
clauses that address pre-trial and trial procedure are so rare.
This account may flow naturally from existing theory. Perhaps
clauses that address costs and payouts, adjudicator number and
identity, and similar matters offer greater benefits—in terms of
improved performance incentives—than clauses that regulate
granular aspects of adjudication procedure.
Or perhaps these clauses appear more frequently because
parties have enough information at the time of the contract to
make an informed guess as to their value. It is noteworthy that
contracts rarely restrict adjudicator discretion over discovery or
fact-finding. 390 An attorney fee-shifting clause, for example,
diminishes party incentives to abuse discovery rules, but it does
not prevent any party from seeking or receiving discovery in any
385. See Unbundling Procedure, supra note 15, at 1961–66 (discussing cost
of specifying forum rules à la carte and suggesting that specification costs will
often be prohibitive).
386. See supra Table 5 (noting that 72.8% of arbitration clauses designate
the number of arbitrators and 25.3% impose an expertise requirement).
387. See supra Tables 4, 5 (finding that 23.9% of contracts require the loser
to pay attorney fees and that 52.4% of arbitration clauses allocate arbitration
costs).
388. See supra Table 4 (noting that 71.5% of contracts limit remedies).
389. Supra Table 4.
390. See supra Tables 4, 5 (reporting very infrequent use of clauses that
regulate discovery or hearing procedures, with most appearing less than 5% of
the time).
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particular instance. 391 By omitting strict rules from the contract,
the parties both delegate the discovery question to the
adjudicator and defer its resolution until a dispute actually
happens. 392 At that time, the adjudicator will have better
information about the nature of the dispute and the evidence
necessary to resolve it. 393 One implication is that customized
procedure will be rare when (i) deferring the decision offers
significant informational advantages and (ii) parties have
confidence in the adjudicator.
This explanation, unlike the contract-as-product account,
posits that contracts result from an essentially rational process.
At the time of contracting, parties weigh the costs and benefits of
up-front drafting precision against those of “back-end”
adjudicator discretion. 394 Most accounts focus on how parties can
expressly vary procedural rules to facilitate this trade-off. 395 But
parties cannot select a procedural rule without making a similar
trade-off. 396 In some cases, it may be less efficient to specify
procedure up front than to let the adjudicator create and apply
procedure when the need arises. 397
VI. Conclusion
Commercial actors do customize the rules of the adjudication
game, in both litigation and arbitration. 398 But they do not do this
391. See supra note 374 and accompanying text (discussing the effects of
loser-pays rules).
392. Forum procedural rules typically allow substantial discretion in such
matters. See, e.g., Charles J. Moxley, Jr., Discovery in Commercial Arbitration:
How Arbitrators Think, 63 DISP. RESOL. J. 36, 36 (2008) (discussing discretion
over discovery in arbitration); United States v. Ortho Biotech Prods., L.P., 719
F.3d 31, 37 (1st Cir. 2013) (noting judicial discretion over discovery).
393. See Unbundling Procedure, supra note 15, at 1963–64 (noting that
customization can inhibit arbitrator’s flexibility to tailor discovery ex post).
394. See Scott & Triantis, supra note 2, at 822 (discussing contracting as a
trade-off between back- and front-end costs).
395. See id. at 817 (exploring the relationship between litigation and
contract design).
396. See supra Part III.B.2 (discussing the difficulty in identifying optimal
procedure and how procedural contracts can impair adjudicator flexibility).
397. Supra Part III.B.2.
398. See supra Part IV (demonstrating how parties change the background
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as often, or as precisely, as one might expect from the theoretical
literature on customized procedure. After choosing default rules,
allocating costs and payouts, and (in arbitration) adjusting
adjudicator incentives, parties seem content to let the process
play out. 399 The result is that judges and arbitrators retain their
traditional discretion to control pre-trial and trial procedure in
light of the information available at the time of the dispute.
These findings suggest the need for a new direction in
customized procedure theory. For one thing, they imply that
normative debates over party-controlled procedure have little
urgency. 400 The more immediate implication is for matters of
contract theory and design. Perhaps enthusiasts have overstated
the benefits, or understated the costs, of many procedural
clauses. Or perhaps contract markets remain stuck in some
dominant paradigm, awaiting a major shock to catalyze
procedural innovation. These and other hypotheses represent the
next phase of research into customized procedure.

rules of litigation).
399. See supra Part IV.C.3–4 (describing how parties tailor procedure
beyond simply choosing a forum).
400. See supra notes 321–328 and accompanying text (noting that the rarity
of procedural modification implies that normative debates are premature).

